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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review orders of
the Labor Commission Appeals Board pursuant

to Utah Code Ann.

§ 34A-1-303(6).

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1.

Whether the Labor Commission Appeals Board erred when it

held that the balance of the proceeds from a third-party tort
action

must

be

applied

to

reduce

the

workers'

compensation

insurer's future obligations under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5).
The

petitioners

are

not

entitled

to

relief

unless

they

establish that they have been "substantially prejudiced" and that
the "agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law."

Utah

Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) (d) . This issue involves the interpretation of section 34A-2-106 (5) , which is reviewed under a correction
of error standard.

E.g., Luckau v. Board of Review, 840 P.2d 811,

813 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

2.

Whether

the

petitioners

may

challenge

the

Labor

Commission's order requiring discounting of future payments in
determining the duration of CNA's offset, where the petitioners
failed

to

oppose

CNA's

request

presented to the Commission.
-1-

for

discounting

when

it

was

The resolution of this issue does not require the "review" of
any decisions made by the Commission, so no standard of review is
applicable.

3.

Whether the Labor Commission abused its discretion in

recognizing that money in hand is worth more than a payment to be
made

years

in

the

obligations

to

their

future,
present

and

so

value

discounted
in

applying

CNA's

future

the

offset

provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5).
This
application

issue
of

involves

the

its

regulations,

own

Commission's

significant deference under UAPA.

interpretation

which

is

entitled

and
to

Union Pacific Ry. v. Auditing

Div., 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1992).

Such a decision will not be

overturned unless the Commission abused its discretion.

Id.

In the alternative, this issue involves the application of a
statute, and the Commission has been granted discretion to apply
the Workers' Compensation Act under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-3 01.
The Commission's application of the Act will not be reversed unless
its decision "exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality."

Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Commission, 342 Utah

Adv. Rep. 7, 8 (Ct. App. April 30, 1998).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301
The commission has the duty and the full power,
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and
apply the law in this chapter or any other title or
chapter it administers.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation
is payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of a person other than an employer, officer,
agent, or employee of the employer:
(a) the injured employee, or in case of death,
the employee's dependents, may claim compensation; and
(b) the injured employee or the employee's
heirs or personal representative may have an action for
damages against the third person.
(2)
(a) If
compensation
is claimed
and
the
employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier:
(i) shall become trustee of the
cause of action against the third party; and
(ii) may bring and maintain the
action either in its own name or in the name
of the injured employee, or the employee's
heirs or the personal representative of the
deceased.
(b) Notwithstanding
Subsection
(2)(a), an
employer or insurance carrier may not settle and release
a cause of action of which it is a trustee under
Subsection (2)(a) without the consent of the commission.
(3)
(a) Before proceeding against a third party,
to give a person described in Subsections (3) (a) (i) and

-3-

(ii) a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in
the proceeding, the injured employee or, in case of
death, the employee's heirs, shall give written notice of
the intention to bring an action against the third party
to:
(i) the carrier; and
(ii) any other person obligated for
the compensation payments.
(b) The injured employee, or, in case of
death, the employee's heirs, shall give written notice to
the
carrier
and
other
person
obligated
for
the
compensation payments of any known attempt to attribute
fault to the employer, officer, agent, or employee of the
employer:
(i) by way of settlement; or
(ii) in a proceeding brought by the
injured employee, or, in case of death, the
employee's heirs.

(5)
If any recovery is obtained against a third
person, it shall be disbursed in accordance with
Subsections (5)(a) through (c).
(a) The reasonable expense of the action,
including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their interests
may appear.
Any fee chargeable to the employer or
carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the
injured employee or, in the case of death, by the
dependents, for any recovery had against the third party.
(b) The
person
liable
for
compensation
payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in
Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as follows:
(i) without
reduction
based
on
fault attributed to the employer, officer,
agent, or employee of the employer in the
action against the third party if the combined

-4-

percentage of fault attributed to persons
immune from suit is determined to be less than
40% prior to any reallocation of fault under
Subsection 78-27-39(2); or
(ii) less the amount of payments
made multiplied by the percentage of fault
attributed to the employer, officer, agent, or
employee of the employer in the action against
the third party if the combined percentage of
fault attributed to persons immune from suit
is determined to be 40% or more prior to any
reallocation
of
fault
under
Subsection
78-27-39(2) .
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured
employee, or the employee's heirs in case of death, to be
applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for
compensation.

Utah Admin. Code R568-1-11 (repealed eff. July 1, 1997)
Eight percent shall be used for any discounting or
present value calculations. Lump sums ordered by the
Commission of any permanent partial benefit award as per
Section 35-1-79, U.C.A., or for any attorney fees paid in
a single up-front amount instead of across the length of
an award up to 312 week maximum allowed by Rule R568-1-7,
or of any other sum being paid earlier than normally paid
under a weekly benefit method shall be subject to the 8%
discounting.
The Commission shall create and make
available a precise discount or present value table based
on a 3 65 day year. For those instances where discount
calculations are not routinely utilized or where the
Commission's table is not available, the following table,
which is a shortened version of the precise table, may be
utilized by interpolating between the stated weeks and
the related discount.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is a Petition for Review of an Order of the Labor
Commission Appeals Board holding that respondents Redd Roofing &
Construction Co. and CNA Insurance Company are entitled to an
offset against their future workers' compensation obligations to
the petitioners in the amount of $68,507.97.

(Addendum Exhibit 1.)

This amount was the balance remaining from an action against a
third-party tortfeasor whose negligence contributed to the industrial accident that claimed the life of Mr. Edward Esquivel, the
petitioners'

decedent.

The

Order

respondents'

future obligations

further

provided

to the petitioners

that

the

had to be

discounted to their present value in determining the duration of
the offset represented by the money recovered in the third-party
tort action.

Course of Proceedings
The petitioners, dependents of Mr. Edward Esquivel, filed an
application for hearing with the Industrial Commission on July 17,
1996, claiming that respondents Redd Roofing and CNA had illegally
stopped making benefit payments. R. 106-07. The Esquivels alleged
that they were entitled to continued payments as compensation for
the death of Mr. Esquivel, who died in an industrial accident
working for Redd Roofing on April 26, 1993.
-6-

Id.

CNA filed an

answer on August 16, 1996,

explaining that it had ceased payments

because of the money the Esquivels had recovered from the thirdparty tort action.

R. 112-15.

CNA further explained that under

the Workers' Compensation Act it was entitled to a reimbursement of
benefits paid prior to that date and an offset against future
obligations.

Id.

On February 7, 1997, the Honorable Judge Benjamin A. Sims,
Administrative Law Judge, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and an Order ("ALJ
resume

making

weekly

without any offset.

Findings") directing CNA to immediately

compensation

payments

to

the Esquivels,

R. 161-69 (Addendum Exhibit 2 ) . On March 7,

1997, CNA filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission.
R. 170-90
before

the

(Addendum Exhibit 3) .
Commission,

Compensation Act went

the

While the matter was pending

1997

amendments

into effect.

to

the

The Industrial

Workers1
Commission

ceased its eighty-year existence, and the matter was referred to
the newly created Labor Commission Appeals Board.

R. 261.

On

January 14, 1998, the Appeals Board issued an Order Granting Motion
for Review ("Order") , holding that CNA was entitled to an offset in
an amount equal to the balance remaining from the third-party
action after the attorney fees and costs of the litigation were
paid.

Addendum Exhibit 1, R. 262-65.

The Esquivels timely filed

their petition for review of that order on February 13, 1998.
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Statement of Facts
On April 26, 1993, the decedent, Edward Esquivel, sustained a
fatal injury when he fell off a roof while working for respondent
Redd Roofing & Construction Company, who was insured by respondent
CNA Insurance Company.

ALJ Findings, Addendum Exhibit 2, R. 161.

In early 1994, the Esquivels received $375,000 in a settlement from
Freeport Center Associates, the owner of the building on which the
accident happened.

Id. R. 164. The Esquivels and CNA then entered

into an agreement, formalized by a Stipulated Order, requiring CNA
to pay $2 05 per week for as long as the dependents were entitled to
receive death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.1
R.

162.

CNA also agreed to accept

Id.

$8,263.84 to satisfy its

workers' compensation lien rights accruing up until that point.
Id. R. 161. This agreement was approved by the Commission on March
7, 1994.

R. 14.

The Esquivels then pursued another third-party tort action,
against Gravely International, the maker of the roof-sweeper Mr.
Esquivel was using when the accident occurred.
163.

ALJ Findings, R.

However, the Esquivels failed to notify CNA that they were

pursuing this other action, and they failed to notify CNA of
Gravely's attempt to attribute a portion of the fault to Redd
Roofing.

Id.

This failure to notify CNA violated subsections

(3)(a) and (3)(b) of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (now § 34A-2-106).

x

This figure represents the statutory maximum rate at the time
of the accident, $341, times sixty percent.
-8-

In the action against Gravely, the jury found that the total
damages were

$814,029, and

fault was

apportioned

as follows:

twenty-five percent to Gravely, fifty percent to Redd Roofing, and
twenty-five percent to Edward Esquivel.

Id. R. 165. Therefore, on

April 9, 1996, Judge Tena Campbell entered an order awarding the
Esquivels $203,507.25.

Id. The costs of pursuing this action were

$53,596.38, and the attorneys' fees amounted to $81,402.90, which
was forty percent of the gross judgment, and fifty-four percent of
the judgment remaining after the costs were paid.

Id. R. 167.

Thus, the balance remaining after the costs and fees were paid was
$68,507.97.

Id.

After the judgment was entered, CNA stopped making weekly
benefit payments, because the Workers' Compensation Act provides
that a workers' compensation insurer has a right of reimbursement
and future credit for any money recovered in a third-party action
by an injured employee or his dependents.

Id. R. 161.

CNA's most

recent payment was made on March 27, 1996, covering the period
through April 1, 1996.

R. 172-73.

From the time of the 1994

settlement agreement until March 27, 1996, CNA had paid a total of
$21,320.

ALJ

Findings,

R.

166.

Also,

under

the Workers'

Compensation Act, a child of a deceased worker is conclusively
presumed to be dependent until he or she turns eighteen, and Mr.
Esquivel's youngest child will not turn eighteen until January 5,
2 008.

Thus, at the time the Esquivels received their tort award,

CNA was obligated to make payments for approximately another 617
-9-

weeks.

The nominal value of CNA's future obligation at that time

was approximately $126,602, id. R. 166, but the then-present value
was $83,000.

Commission Order, Exhibit 1, R. 263.

The Esquivels filed their application for hearing, asking the
Commission to require CNA to continue making

the $2 05 weekly

payments with no credit for the Esquivels' receipt of the tort
proceeds.

R. 106-07.

CNA opposed because the governing statute,

section 35-1-62(5), provided that (1) after the proceeds of a tort
recovery are used to pay the reasonable expenses of the litigation,
the

workers'

reimbursement

compensation

insurer

is

entitled

for amounts already paid, and

to

receive

a

(2) any remaining

"balance" must be used to offset the insurer's future obligations.
R. 112-15.
On

February

7,

1997,

the

Honorable

Benjamin

A.

Sims,

Administrative Law Judge, entered his Findings, concluding that the
Esquivels

were

entitled

to

keep

the

entire

absolutely no offset or benefits to CNA.

$68,507.97

with

Exhibit 2, R. 161-68.

The ALJ reasoned that CNA's past and future obligations under the
Workers' Compensation Act totalled $147,922, so CNA's "interest" in
the recovery from the tort action was that amount.

Id. R. 166.

The ALJ further reasoned, however, that CNA could only have an
interest in the net recovery.

Id. R. 167.

The ALJ therefore took

the $203,507 gross judgment, subtracted the $81,402.90 in fees and
the

$53,596

in costs, and

"reduced to $68,507.97."

Id.

concluded

that

CNA's

interest

was

The ALJ then reasoned that, since
-10-

CNA was "potentially entitled" to the entire net judgment because
of its priority under the Workers' Compensation Act, it had to be
charged the entire amount of the costs and fees:

"Since CNA has a

claim for 100 percent of the net recovery, it must pay 100 percent
of the attorneys' fees and costs."

Id.

Then, even though he had

just subtracted the fees and costs in reducing CNA's interest to
$68,507, the ALJ subtracted the fees and costs again:

"Since CNA's

proportionate share of fees and costs is $134,999.28, CNA's lien
must be reduced by that amount."

Id.

The ALJ therefore concluded

that, even though there was a balance of $68,507.97 remaining from
the tort action, "CNA is thus not given any credit for any offset
or reimbursement."

Id.

CNA thus filed its motion for review.

Exhibit 3, R. 170-84.

In its motion, CNA explained that the statute plainly required that
the "balance" must be used to offset the workers' compensation
insurer's future obligations.

Id. R. 176-77.

CNA also pointed out

that the ALJ had mistakenly subtracted the fees and costs twice in
denying CNA its offset, and CNA noted that the ALJ's order ended up
charging CNA with all the expenses of the tort action while giving
it none of the benefits.

la. R. 177-78.

CNA further pointed out

that the ALJ's order gave the Esquivels a double recovery because
it allowed them to receive the full amount of the tort proceeds and
the full amount of their workers' compensation benefits.
180.

Id. R.

Finally, CNA noted that Commission regulations required the

use of discounting to present value in determining the effect of
-11-

lump sum payments in lieu of weekly benefits, and that discounting
must be applied

to determine

the duration of

received from the tort proceeds.

Id. R. 180-83.

requested an order that CNA not be required
payments until January 23, 2005.

the offset

CNA

CNA therefore

to resume weekly

Id. R. 174.

The Esquivels opposed the motion, once again claiming that the
fees and costs had to be subtracted from the net

judgment (that is,

the amount remaining after the fees and costs had already been
subtracted) in determining the insurer's offset.
201.

Notably, the Esquivels never opposed CNA's request that the

Commission apply discounting.
On January

Id. R. 191-205.

14, 1998, the Labor Commission Appeals Board

entered its Order Granting Motion for Review.
65.

Exhibit 4, R.

Exhibit 1, R. 262-

The Commission recognized that the plain language of the

governing

statute

grants

the

insurer

a

"first

right

of

reimbursement and offset" once the expenses of the tort litigation
are paid.

Id. R. 2 64.

The Commission agreed that because CNA had

all the interest in the proceeds, it would be charged all the fees
and costs, but the Commission correctly subtracted the expenses
only once,

so it concluded that there was a "balance" remaining of

$68,507.97.

Id.

The Commission then reasoned that because the

statute required that the "balance" be "applied to reduce" the
insurer's future obligations, CNA was entitled to "use the third
party award to offset its obligation to make weekly payments to the
dependents, until such time as the award has been exhausted."
-12-

Id.

Finally, the Commission ordered that CNA be allowed to use the
eight percent discount rate in determining when the lump sum award
was exhausted.

Id.

The Esquivels now bring this petition for review.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Workers' Compensation Act explicitly provides that after
the expenses of a third-party tort action are paid, any remaining
"balance" must be used to offset the insurer's future workers'
compensation obligations to the injured employee.

In our case,

there was clearly a balance of $68,507.97 remaining from the tort
proceeds after the attorney fees and costs were paid.

Therefore,

the Labor Commission Appeals Board correctly ordered that this
balance

be

used

to

offset

CNA's

future

obligations

to

the

Esquivels.
The Esquivels claim that CNA is not entitled to any offset.
But there is undeniably a "balance" from the tort action, and that
balance must

be used as a setoff against CNA's future obligations.

Denying CNA its offset would violate both the plain language and
the intent of the governing statute, as doing so would reverse the
priorities recognized by the statute and would give the Esquivels
a double

recovery.

In fact,

the resolution proposed

by the

Esquivels would actually negate the statute entirely.
The Esquivels propose a formula for the allocation of the tort
-13-

proceeds, but this formula is plagued by several problems.

First,

its results are inconsistent with Utah law, and as such the formula
cannot be adopted.

The formula's application in the instant case

flies in the face of the governing statute.

Moreover, the formula

is inherently invalid, as by definition the formula violates the
statute's requirement that the fees and costs be charged "proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear."

The

formula suffers from inherent analytical defects as well, as it is
based

on

inaccurate

assumptions

and

internally

contradictory

premises.
The Esquivels assert that the governing statute is "unfair"
because it gives the insurer priority over the employee in the
distribution of the tort proceeds while the employee brings the
tort action.

But the statute must be applied as written, even if

the Esquivels do not like it.

Moreover, when looked at in the

context of the entire workers' compensation scheme, giving the
insurer

priority

is

not

unfair,

as

the

insurer

guarantees

compensation to all injured employees, regardless of fault.

The

insurer is required to pay compensation even if the accident is
entirely the fault of the employee or of third persons, but in
exchange the insurer receives priority in the distribution of the
tort proceeds. In addition, the Esquivels' attorneys could have
alleviated a great deal of the risk if they had informed CNA they
were bringing the action, as the statute clearly requires them to
do.

Finally, the risks faced by the Esquivels -- bringing a tort
-14-

action and ending up with no net benefit -- are really no different
from the risks faced by the plaintiff in every civil action.
The

Esquivels

discounting

also

in determining

object

to

the

Commission's

the length of the offset

receive because of the tort recovery.

use

of

CNA will

But the Esquivels did not

object to this when it was raised before the Commission, so they
are precluded

from complaining now.

Moreover, discounting is

required under the Commission's own regulations, and it certainly
cannot

be

ordering

said

it.

that

the

Commission

abused

its

discretion

in

Finally, even if there were no regulation, the

Commission's use of discounting is a reasonable application of the
governing statute and is entitled to substantial deference under
UAPA.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE LABOR COMMISSION APPEALS BOARD PROPERLY HELD THAT THE
BALANCE OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE THIRD PARTY TORT ACTION MUST
BE APPLIED TO REDUCE CNA'S FUTURE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LIABILITY TO THE ESQUIVELS.

A.

CNA's

The governing statute plainly requires that any balance
remaining after fees, costs, and reimbursement must be
used to "reduce or satisfy in full" the workers'
compensation insurer's future liability to the employee
or his or her dependents.

argument

is really very

simple:

Under

the plain

language of the Workers' Compensation Act, any balance remaining
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from a third-party tort action must be used to offset the insurer's
future liability to the injured worker

(or his dependents).

And

after the costs and fees of the Esquivels' third-party tort action
were paid, there was a balance of $68,507.97.

Therefore, this

balance must be used to offset CNA's future obligations to the
Esquivels.

The Commission's order was therefore correct.

Distribution of the proceeds of a third-party tort action is
presently governed by Utah Code Ann § 34A-2-106(5), which provides
as follows:
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person,
it shall be disbursed as follows:
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including
attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear.
Any fee chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a
credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or,
in the case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery
had against the third party.
(b) The person liable for compensation payments
shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate share of
costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection
(5)(a), for the payments made as follows:

(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be applied to
reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter
accruing against the person liable for compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5)

(1997 repl. v o l . ) . 2

2

CNA quotes the present version of the statute here for ease
of discussion. However, "in workers' compensation claims, the law
existing at the time of the injury applies in relation to that
-16-

Thus, under subsection

(5) (a) , the proceeds of an action

against a third party must first be used to pay the reasonable
expenses

of

the

action.

Next, under

subsection

(5) (b) , the

workers' compensation insurer must be reimbursed, less its share of
fees and costs.

Then under subsection (5)(c), the balance goes to

the employee or dependents, jbut the

offset

against

future

insurer

is

entitled

to

an

payments.

The Labor Commission's order distributed the proceeds from the
tort action against Gravely International exactly as directed by
the statute.

The recovery from the action was $203,507.25.

Under

paragraph (a), the attorney fees and costs ($134,999.28) were paid
out of this amount.
paragraph
remained.

CNA has waived any right to reimbursement, so

(b) did not apply.

Thus, at this point, $68,507.97

Under the plain language of the statute, this was

clearly the "balance."

So under paragraph

(c) , the Commission

ordered that this amount be paid to the Esquivels and be "applied

injury." Brown & Root Indus, v. Indus. Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 675
(Utah 1997).
At the time of the accident, CNA's right to
reimbursement and offset was guaranteed by former Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-62, which did NOT contain any provision for reducing the
employer's or insurer's reimbursement by the percentage of fault
attributable to the employer. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988
repl. vol.) (Addendum Exhibit 5) . The provision limiting the right
to reimbursement did not go into effect until May 2, 1994. See
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106, Amendment Notes.
CNA has waived any right to reimbursement, however, contingent
on receiving a full offset.
Motion for Review, R. 176 n.3
(Addendum Exhibit 3 ) . So the 1994 amendment to the statute should
not come into play.
-17-

to reduce . . . any obligation thereafter accruing against the
person liable for compensation." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5)(c).
Of course, the attorney fees and other litigation expenses had
to be "charged proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear."

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5)(a).

And as the

Esquivels have pointed out in their brief, because there was not
enough money left over to fully satisfy CNA's future liabilities,
CNA's "interest" in the tort proceeds was one hundred percent, and
it must be charged the entire amount of the fees and costs. But as
the statute plainly provides, this amount can only be charged out
of the gross

judgment.

The statute provides that fees and costs must be paid out of
the "recovery," so as a matter of basic logic the "recovery" can
only be the amount available before

fees and costs are subtracted.

Thus, although the entire amount of the fees and expenses must be
charged

to CNA,

"recovery."
noted above.

they

can only be

taken out

of

the

$203,507

Consequently, the "balance" is still $68,507.97, as
And it was this "balance" that was used to offset

CNA's future liability to the Esquivels. The Commission's Order is
therefore perfectly in accordance with the governing statute.
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B.

Denying CNA its setoff would violate both the plain
language and the intent of the governing statute.

Despite the plain language of the statute, the Esquivels claim
that CNA is not entitled to any setoff at all.

But whatever

"formula" may be proposed, whatever assumptions may be made, and
whatever reasoning may be used, the bottom line is that once the

dust settles, there is

clearly

third-party

and the law unambiguously

this

tort

balance

action,

be used

a "balance"

to offset

remaining

CNA's future

from

requires

liability

the
that

to

the

Esquivels.
Denying CNA its offset would violate both the language and the
purpose of section 34A-2-106(5) . As set forth in the previous section, the statute provides that money recovered in a tort action
must be distributed in the following order:
ment, and offset.

expenses, reimburse-

Anything left over is then distributed to the

employee or dependents free and clear.

So the statute plainly

gives the insurer priority over the employee and his dependents:
"It is elementary that the claimant should not be allowed to keep
the entire amount both of his compensation award and of his commonlaw damage recovery.
give

the

employer

The obvious disposition of the matter is to
so much

of

the

negligence

recovery

as is

necessary to reimburse him for his compensation outlay, and to
the
1186

employee
(Utah

the

excess.1'

1987)

give

Taylor v. Indus. Comm'n, 743 P.2d 1183,

(emphasis

added)
-19-

(quoting

Shields

v.

Wveth

Laboratories, 513 P.2d 404, 405-06 (Idaho 1973)).3
The Esquivels, on the other hand, propose to turn this process
upside down by giving the employee
ceeds.

first crack at the tort pro-

They essentially argue that because there is not enough

money to go around, they keep it all -- with no offset.
in the face of section 34A-2-106(5).
to be arguing that it is because
that CNA ends up with nothing:

This flies

Indeed, the Esquivels appear

the statute gives CNA priority

CNA has the primary "interest," so

it gets charged with all the expenses, which leaves CNA with no
reimbursement and no offset.

In other words, CNA has all the

interest, so it ends up with none of the benefits of the tort,
action, and because the Esquivels presumably have no interest, they
end up with all of the benefits!

This simply cannot be.

Moreover, ruling in favor of the Esquivels would frustrate one
of the key purposes of the statute, which is to prevent an employee
or his dependents

from recovering

twice

for the same injury.

Allstate v. Bliss, 725 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Utah 1986).

3

In our case

The Commission was therefore completely correct when it
stated that the insurer had the "first right of reimbursement" and
that CNA's interest "takes precedence over the claimants'
interest."
And nothing in Worthen changes this.
Worthen v.
Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223 (Utah 1967) . While Worthen
held that the insurer had to pay its share of the litigation
expenses, it actually confirmed
the insurer's priority over the
employee. Worthen explained that the allocation of proceeds had to
follow the order set forth in the statute, so immediately after the
fees and costs are paid, "the reimbursement to the insurer is made
from the funds remaining." Id. at 226.
-20-

there are two pools of money:
compensation benefits.

the tort proceeds and the workers'

The purpose of each of these funds is to

compensate the Esquivels for the accident.
asking this court to award them every
and every

dollar

dollar

But the Esquivels are
of the tort proceeds

of the workers' compensation benefits.

This is

precisely what the statute was intended to prevent.
Indeed, such a ruling would effectively eliminate the statute
entirely.

Picture what would happen if section 34A-2-106(5) did

not even exist.

If there were no provision for an insurer or

employer to take part in any third-party tort recovery, then the
employee would recover all of the tort proceeds and still be
entitled to receive full workers' compensation benefits.

This is

exactly what the Esquivels are proposing.

C.

The Esquivels' proposed "formula" cannot be adopted.

Instead of simply acknowledging the plain language of the
governing statute, the Esquivels ask this court to adopt a formula
to determine how the proceeds of a tort action should be distributed.

Of course, the statute already directs how the proceeds

are to be distributed,

so no formula

is necessary.

But the

proposed

formula also leads to results

that violate the Utah

statute.

And the formula itself is invalid because it is based on

assumptions lacking any basis in reality or logic.
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CNA therefore

requests that this court reject the proposed formula and instead
apply the statute according to its plain language.

1.

The proposed formula leads to absurd results
and is inconsistent with Utah law.

First, the Esquivels' proposed
results.

formula

leads to improper

For example, in the instant case, the formula leads to an

outcome that flatly violates the law.

As demonstrated above, the

governing statute clearly grants the insurer priority over the
employee in the distribution of the proceeds, but using the formula
would result in CNA receiving nothing while the Esquivels receive
$68,507.97 free and clear.
that

any

"balance"

be

Moreover, the statute plainly requires

used

to

offset

the

insurer's

future

liabilities, but the formula results in no offset, even though
there

is obviously a balance.

Finally, the statute

requires

expenses to be charged "proportionately," but use of the formula in
this case results in CNA being charged 100% of the expenses and
receiving 0% of the benefit, while the Esquivels pay 0% of the
expenses and receive 100% of the benefit.
The Esquivels contend that their "formula" is proper, it's
just the result that happens to be unusual.

This is nonsense.

If

the application of a formula clearly violates the statute, the
formula

simply

cannot

be valid.

Indeed,

the

Esquivels' own

examples provide additional evidence that their formula is invalid.
-22-

For example, the Esquivels' "Example No. 3" (Petitioners' Addendum
Exhibit 5) shows that if the verdict in the third-party action had
been over eight hundred thousand dollars, CNA would have received
only eighteen

thousand

dollars

in reimbursement or offset.

To

suggest that such a huge judgment would not be enough to take care
of a $20,000 reimbursement is patently absurd.

In fact, under the

Esquivels' formula, even a fifty million dollar judgment would give
CNA a setoff of only $48,857, less than one-third of its lien.4
The Esquivels' formula cannot be used in Utah because it does
not result in litigation expenses being charged "proportionately"
against the parties as their interests may appear. Our case is not
an aberration, either; in fact, the Esquivels' proposed formula can
never

result in fees and costs being charged proportionately.

In

Worthen v. Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223 (Utah 1967), the
attorney fee was one-fourth of the judgment, so the Utah Supreme
Court held that the carrier must be charged one-fourth of its lien
as its proportionate share of the fees.

And in Prettyman v. Utah

State Dep't of Finance, 496 P.2d 89 (Utah 1972), the attorney fee
was one-third of the settlement amount, and the insurer was ordered

4

If the gross judgment were $50,000,000, the total expenses of
litigation would be $20,053,596 (forty percent attorney fee of
$20,000,000, plus costs of $53,596). Thus, the net judgment would
be $2 9,94 6,4 04. CNA's "proportionate share" of the expenses would
thus be 0.494% (147,922 / 29,946,404). Multiplying this percentage
by the total expenses shows that CNA's actual share of the expenses
would be $99,065. Subtracting this amount from CNA's lien leads to
a reimbursement/offset of $48,857.
-23-

charged one-third of its lien as its share of the fees.
both

instances

of

"proportionate"

allocation.

These are

But under the

Esquivels' formula, if the contingent fee is one-third, the insurer
will always

be charged at least one-half of its lien -- and a much

higher percentage if the costs are significant!

(A mathematical

analysis of the Esquivels' proposed formula is provided at Addendum
Exhibit 6.)

And if the contingent

fee is forty percent, the

insurer would always be charged at least two-thirds of its lien as
its so-called "proportionate" share of expenses.
For these reasons, the court cannot rely on Breen v. Caesar's
Palace, 715 P.2d

1070

(Nev. 1986) .

The formula used in Breen

appears to be identical to the one proposed by the Esquivels on
this appeal.

But Breen cannot be followed in Utah, because the

statute in Nevada is significantly different
governing in Utah.

from the statute

Most importantly, the Nevada statute does not

require that the fees be charged "proportionately"!

See former

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.560 (quoted in Breen, 715 P.2d at 1071 n.l) .
A case applying a completely different statute will not have any
persuasive value in Utah.

And, as shown above, use of the formula

guarantees that the expenses will not

be charged proportionately.

In fact, the hypothetical presented in Breen would result in
the insurer paying fees at a rate over twenty

times

higher

than

that charged the employee's dependents. In the Breen hypothetical,
the insurer is charged $325,000 in attorney fees to satisfy a lien
-24-

of $650,000.

Thus, the insurer ends up paying half of its lien in

expenses (even though the litigation expenses were only one-third
of the judgment) . And the employee's family nets $341,666 from the
tort action,5 but is charged only $8,333 in fees:

a rate of 2.4%.

If the insurer pays a relative fee of 50% and the worker a fee of
only 2.4%, the fees are not being charged "proportionately."

Breen

thus cannot be followed in Utah; instead, this court must follow
cases such as Worthen and Prettyman, which require that the fees
charged

to the insurer must be directly proportionate

to the

benefit the insurer receives from the tort action.

2.

The

The proposed formula suffers from significant
analytical defects.

Esquivels' proposed

foundational flaws.

formula

suffers

from

some

major

The most important problem is that after the

carrier's share of expenses is calculated, that amount is then
subtracted from the net
carrier's offset.

judgment in determining the amount of the

But both the statute and simple logic provide

that fees and costs can only be charged against a gross

5

judgment.

In the hypothetical discussed in Breen, the worker's family
ends up with a total of $991,666 in compensation payments and tort
recovery:
$666,666 from the tort action, and the remaining
$325,000 in workers' compensation benefits (because Caesar's
received a net offset of $325,000). Without the tort action, the
family would have received a total of $650,000, so the worker's
family receives a net benefit from the tort action of $341,666.
-25-

First, as a matter of plain English, the "gross" judgment is
the

amount

of

subtracted.

the

judgment

before

fees

and

costs

have

been

And the "net" judgment is the amount remaining after

those expenses have been subtracted.

Simply put, charging the fees

and costs against the gross judgment is the only approach that
could possibly make any sense.

Also, as noted above, the statute

itself requires that the fees and costs be charged out of the
"recovery"

-- which obviously includes

the expenses.

CNA was

already charged once for the fees and costs when the $203,507
judgment was reduced to $68,507.

It would be illogical and unfair

to charge CNA with those same expenses a second time.
Finally,

the expenses must be charged

against

the gross

judgment because that is how they were actually paid.

No money

came out of either party's pockets, so the only way to conclude
that any expenses were actually "paid" would be to compare the net
proceeds to the amounts that would

have

been

received in the

absence of those expenses -- that is, the gross judgment.

So when

we talk about expenses that CNA should be charged, these amounts
can only be based on the gross judgment.

Therefore, because CNA

receives all of the benefit of the tort proceeds, it pays all the
expenses.

But those expenses must be taken out of the gross

recovery.
The Esquivels appear to base their approach on the unsupported
assumption that they have already paid the expenses, so they must
-26-

be reimbursed by CNA.

But it is simply a fallacy to say that the

Esquivels "paid" the attorney fees and costs. Again, nothing came
out of the Esquivels' pockets; rather, the fees and costs were paid
the judgment.6

out of

Thus, there would be no basis to require CNA

to "reimburse" the Esquivels for the expenses of the litigation.
The Esquivels may contend that the fees and costs were taken
out of "their" judgment, but this, too, would be false.
governing
belonged

statute clearly provides, the judgment
entirely

to

the

Esquivels.

Instead,

For as the

never really
because

CNA's

reimbursement and offset interests take priority over the Esquivels' remainder interest, the money received was to be used first
to reimburse CNA, and second to offset CNA's future liability.

So

the money used to "pay" the expenses was actually supposed to go to
CNA, either directly or as an offset.

Therefore, if the attorney

fees and costs were paid by anyone, they were actually paid by CNA.
Similarly, the Esquivels cannot contend that because they were
originally nominally liable for the costs and fees, they must have
"paid" those expenses.

As the statute provides, any expenses

"chargeable" to the insurer are a "credit upon any fee payable by
the injured employee."

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5)(a).

Thus,

because all of the expenses are "chargeable" to CNA, the Esquivels

6

Also, the contention that the Esquivels paid the fees and
costs contradicts the Esquivels' position that the fees and costs
were not part of the "pie." Obviously, if the expenses were not
part of the pie, they could not have been paid by the Esquivels.
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receive a credit against any expenses "payable" by them.

And

because all of the expenses are chargeable under the statute to
CNA, the Esquivels were entirely relieved of their liability for
the fees and costs.
If CNA had brought the third-party action itself, it undoubtedly would have been entitled to an offset against its future
obligations. But 34A-2-106(5) applies the same regardless of which
party actually files the tort action. Subsection (1) (b) authorizes
the employee or his dependents to bring a third-party tort action.
Subsection (2) allows the insurer or employer to do the same. Then
subsection (5) applies "if any recovery is obtained against a third
person."

Subsection (5) therefore has the same effect whether the

tort action is brought by the employee or the insurer.
So if CNA had brought the action on its own, it would have
been charged the entire amount of expenses. That is, it would have
been

responsible

for paying

$81,402.90 in attorney fees.
paid out of CNA's gross

all

$53,596.38

in costs

and all

But these expenses would have been

recovery.

And the $68,507.97 left over

would have been distributed according to subsection (5) : CNA would
have been reimbursed for its previous compensation payments and the
rest would have been paid to the Esquivels and used to reduce CNA's
future obligations.

Under section 34A-2-106(5), the same result

obtains when it is the Esquivels who brought the tort action.
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D.

The Commission's order did not fail to charge CNA with
any litigation expenses.

CNA did not somehow escape being charged with the expenses of
the tort litigation.
with all

Instead, as discussed above, CNA was charged

of the litigation expenses.

CNA ends up with a net

benefit, of course, but this is simply because there was a positive
"balance"

from the action, and because

priority.

the statute gives CNA

If CNA had not been charged expenses, CNA would have

received the benefit of the $203,507 gross
have

been

enough

to

fully

reimburse

judgment, which would

CNA

for

the

$21,32 0 in

compensation payments it had already made and to fully relieve CNA
of all future obligations.
was

not

reimbursed

for

But under the Commission's order, CNA
prior

payments,

and

CNA

must

resume

compensation payments on January 23, 2005, and pay them as long as
required under the Workers' Compensation Act.
making

payments

employee's

well

into

the

future,

widow or children may

attempt

And CNA may end up

because
to

the

claim

deceased

dependency

benefits even after the youngest child turns eighteen.
The Esquivels and their attorneys are essentially trying to
perform the same verbal sleight-of-hand before this court that they
successfully pulled on the ALJ.

By distracting the court with the

discussion of their "formula," they are attempting to make sixtyeight thousand dollars disappear.

But this will not work.

The

simple, undeniable truth is that there is a "balance" of $68,507.97
-29-

left over from the proceeds of the third-party tort action, and no
matter what the Esquivels or their attorneys argue, this money is
supposed to be used as an offset.

E.

The governing statute must be applied as written.

The Esquivels raise various complaints as to the way the statute operates.

Most significantly, the Esquivels complain that the

statute results in their taking a risk, with CNA getting the
benefit.

But there are several responses to this contention.

First, of course, the statute must be applied as written, not as
the Esquivels

wish

it were written.

Second,

Esquivels ended up taking all the financial

the reason the

risk is because of

their own attorneys1 failure to follow the clear requirements of
the law and notify CNA of the action.

Third, the risks faced by

the Esquivels -- that they may not end up recovering anything from
their tort action -- are no different from the risks faced by any
plaintiff.

Fourth, there is no "unfairness" when the statute is

looked at in light of the entire Workers' Compensation Act.
Subsection (5) (c) is unambiguous and must therefore be applied
in accordance

with

its plain

language.

"Only when we

find

ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance
from the legislative history and relevant policy consideration."
City of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954, 957
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(Utah 1996) (quoting Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Utah
1996)).

In our case, the statute could not be any clearer.

It

provides three steps in the distribution of a third-party tort
recovery:

first the expenses are paid, then the reimbursement is

made, and finally, the "balance" is paid to the injured employee or
his dependents, "to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full" the
insurer's remaining obligations.

There is absolutely no ambiguity

in any of these provisions.
Additionally, the Esquivels' financial risks could have been
greatly alleviated if their attorneys had simply obeyed the statute
and told CNA they were proceeding with the action.

Subsection 34A-

2-106(3) (a) requires

or his or her

that

an

injured

employee

dependents planning a third-party tort action must provide the
carrier with "written notice of the intention to bring an action
against the third party."
repl. vol.).

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(3)(a) (1997

Moreover, the statute explicitly requires that this

notice be given before

the action is commenced, so the carrier will

have a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the action.
Id.
not

And it is undisputed that the Esquivels' tort attorneys did
give CNA written notice of their intention to file this third-

party action.

See R. 163.

In fact, the only reason CNA even

learned about the tort action was because CNA's investigator was
deposed by the defendants in the tort action.
Normally, when an injured worker plans to bring a third-party
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action, his or her attorneys comply with this statute and notify
the carrier.

And if the carrier thinks that the action has any

chance, the carrier will agree to be partially or even wholly
liable for the costs of the action.

At the time this third-party

action was brought, CNA still had a substantial future liability to
the Esquivels, so if the Esquivels' attorneys had simply notified
CNA of their intent to pursue the action, CNA would undoubtedly
have agreed to contribute to the costs.

The Esquivels therefore

would not have taken a disproportionate financial risk.

If the

Esquivels have a complaint about the financial risks they took,
they should be complaining to their own attorneys.
Moreover, the risks faced by the Esquivels in their thirdparty action are really no different from the risks faced by every
plaintiff.

That is, the plaintiff in every

lawsuit bears a risk

that he or she will not recover anything or that the expenses of
the action will be greater than the ultimate recovery.

This risk

is not unique to a workers' compensation third-party tort action.
It is true that a plaintiff in a third-party action under section
34A-2-106 has a higher break-even point than a plaintiff in a
"normal" tort action, but this is simply a consequence of the fact
that

the plaintiff

injuries!

has already

received

compensation

for his

The remedy for the problem identified by the Esquivels

is not to ignore the statute, but rather for the plaintiff's
attorney to properly advise his or her client, so that a plaintiff
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only pursues the action if there is a reasonable chance of a
sufficient recovery after the liens have been satisfied.7

Indeed,

the Esquivels even appear to acknowledge that this is what should
have been done.

Petitioners' Brief at 38.

Further, it must be remembered that section 34A-2-106(5) is
just one small part of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, which
itself is a system of tradeoffs.

Under the fundamental compen-

sation principle, the employee gives up the right to sue the
employer for negligence, but in exchange the employer is required
to

pay

compensation

for

any

injury

employment, regardless of fault.

that

arises

out

of

the

In some situations, the workers'

compensation system results in the employee or his family receiving
less than they would have under the common-law tort system.

But

the employee always receives compensation, and in the overwhelming
majority of cases the employee receives compensation where none
would be available under the tort system.
In other words, under the workers' compensation scheme the
employer or insurer becomes a guarantor of every employee's income.
If an employee is hurt on the job, that employee receives compensation.

And the employer's

liability to the employee cannot

7

This case is thus similar to the situation where a personal
injury plaintiff has large hospital bills.
Under Chapter 7 of
Title 38 of the Utah Code, the hospital is entitled to a lien on
any judgment obtained by such a plaintiff. Thus it is not uncommon
for a plaintiff to obtain a rather large "judgment" but no
recovery.
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reduced by any fault attributable to the employee himself or to a
third party.

In fact, even if a jury later finds that the employer

was completely free of fault, the employer still pays, and at the
full rate.

But in exchange for this guarantee, subsection 34A-2-

106(5) gives the employer or insurer priority in the disbursement
of the proceeds of a third-party tort action.

Again, in some

situations this overall tradeoff benefits the employee, and in
others, it benefits the employer.

It is up to the legislature to

determine where to strike the balance, and the legislature has
clearly spoken.

Any objections to the statute should therefore be

addressed to the legislature.
Finally, CNA takes exception to the accusation that it is
being "oppressive" to widows and orphans.

As discussed in the

previous paragraph, the Workers' Compensation Act clearly gives CNA
a priority right to the proceeds, in exchange for CNA's guarantee
of income to the Esquivels regardless of fault.

Even if the jury

had found that the accident was entirely Mr. Esquivel's fault, or
that no one was negligent, the Esquivels still were guaranteed full
workers' compensation benefits for at least fourteen years.

And

just for the record, when the Esquivels settled their original
third-party action for $375,000, CNA could have insisted on a full
offset against any future compensation liability.

There was more

than enough money left over after expenses to offset CNA's obligations for many years. But CNA instead voluntarily agreed to settle
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its lien at that point for only a forty percent offset against
future compensation payments.

In fact, the only reason CNA even

has a claim to the proceeds of the Gravely action is because CNA
let the Esquivels keep the bulk of the original action free and
clear.
It is unfortunate that the Esquivels went through a lot of
effort for no net gain.

But in this respect they are no different

from any other unsuccessful plaintiffs. As noted above, the remedy
for this problem is for attorneys to properly advise their clients
as to the clear requirements of the law.

Section 34A-2-106(5)

explicitly gives CNA a right to an offset for the balance recovered
in

the

action,

accordance
providing

with
for

and

that

its

plain

the

offset

statute

simply

language.
was

must

The

therefore

be

applied

Commission's

correct

and

in

order

must

be

affirmed.

II.

THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S RULING THAT CNA'S
FUTURE PAYMENTS MUST BE DISCOUNTED TO THEIR PRESENT VALUE IN
DETERMINING THE LENGTH OF CNA'S OFFSET.

A.

The Esquivels are precluded from raising this issue on
appeal because they failed to raise it below.

First, the Esquivels have waived their right to challenge the
Commission's order regarding discounting, because they chose not to
oppose CNA's request for discounting below.
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It is a basic prin-

ciple of administrative law that "issues not raised in proceedings
before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review
except in exceptional circumstances."

Brown & Root v. Indus.

Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997).

When CNA filed its motion

for review with the Commission, it pointed out that its future
obligations had to be discounted in determining the duration of the
offset. Motion for Review, R. 180-83 (Addendum Exhibit 3) . And in
their response to the motion, the Esquivels did not oppose this
request.

Response to Motion for Review, R. 191-204

Exhibit 4) .

(Addendum

The Esquivels had the opportunity to present to the

Commission their reasons why the Commission should not or could not
apply discounting, but they chose not to.

They cannot now claim

that the Commission erred in ordering discounting.

See, e.g. Alvin

G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Indus. Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah
1984)

(where Second

Injury Fund failed to raise issue in its

opposition to a motion for review, it was precluded from raising
that issue on appeal).

B-

The Commission's order requiring discounting was a proper
application of the Commission's own regulations.

In the alternative, even if the court chooses to address the
merits, the portion of the order requiring discounting is certainly
within the Commission's discretion and should be affirmed.

The

Esquivels received the judgment for $68,507.97 on April 9, 1996, to
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be applied to satisfy CNA's obligation to make future payments. At
that time, CNA was obligated to pay $205 per week at least until at
least January 5, 2008.

But under basic principles of accounting,

a $2 05 payment made on say, January 1, 1998, is worth substantially
more than $2 05 due to be paid on January 1, 2 008.8
determining

the number of weekly payments

Therefore, in

represented

by the

$68,507.97 recovered in 1996, the amount of each future weekly
payment must be discounted to reflect this difference.
Discounting is required under the Commission's regulations.
These regulations provide that when a lump sum payment is made to
satisfy future weekly obligations, the future payments shall be
discounted using a rate of eight percent. At all times relevant to
this action, Rule R568-1-11 provided that
Eight percent shall be used for any discounting or
present value calculations. Lump sums ordered by the
Commission of any permanent partial benefit award as per
Section 35-1-79, U.C.A., or for any attorney fees paid in
a single up-front amount instead of across the length of
an award up to 312 week maximum allowed by Rule R568-1-7,

or of any other
under

a weekly

sum being paid earlier
benefit

method

discounting. . . . For those
calculations
are not routinely

than normally

paid

shall be subject to the 8%

instances
utilized

where
discount
or where the

Commission's table is not available, the following table,
which is a shortened version of the precise table, may be
utilized by interpolating between the stated weeks and
the related discount.
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-11 (repealed) (emphasis added).9

In our

8

At the eight percent discount rate provided by Rule R568-111, a $205 payment due in ten years is worth $94.96 today.
industrial Commission Rule R568-1-11 has been replaced by
Labor Commission Rule R612-1-4, which is very similar in substance.
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case, the Esquivels received a lump sum of $68,507.97.

This was

obviously a sum "being paid earlier than normally paid under a
weekly benefit method."

Therefore R568-1-11 applies, and each

future payment must be discounted to its present value to determine
how much that payment is "worth" today.

Each discounted future

weekly payment should then be subtracted from the balance until the
$68,507.97 is exhausted.

CNA must be given credit for that number

of future payments, and it should resume paying $205 per week after
that number of weeks has expired.
The Commission's interpretation of its own regulations is
entitled to significant deference under UAPA.

For even if the

Commission has departed from its own regulation, its decision to do
so will be upheld unless the Commission has abused its discretion.
"Because courts should uphold agency rules if they are reasonable
and rational, courts should also uphold reasonable and rational
departures from those rules absent a showing that the departure
violated some other right." Union Pacific R. v. Auditing Div., 842
P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1992).
The purpose of R568-1-11 is obviously to recognize the basic
accounting principles discussed above.

And even if the instant

situation does not fall within the strict language of R568-1-11,
there is nothing in the rule to suggest that the three examples
provided there are the only
be applied.

situations in which discounting could

Cf. Willardson v. Indus. Comm'n, 904 P.2d 671, 674
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(Utah 1995)

(three examples set forth in regulation regarding

referral to medical panel were deemed to be illustrative, not
exhaustive, and referral to panel was required in a situation not
listed in the regulation).

Indeed, the regulation's reference to

situations where discounts are "not routinely utilized" recognizes
that

other

situations

appropriate.

At

any

will

arise

rate,

the

where

discounting

principles

behind

will

be

R568-1-11

certainly have nothing to do with the source of the lump sum
payment.

Thus it was perfectly reasonable for the Commission to

apply R568-1-11 in our case.

C.

Even without the regulation, the Commission's use of
discounting was a reasonable application of the governing
statute.

Finally, even if there were no regulation requiring discounting,

the order would be proper as a reasonable application of

section 34A-2-106(5).

The Legislature has granted the Labor Com-

mission the "duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority
to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any
other title or chapter it admininsters."
301 (1997 repl. vol.).

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-

In Caporoz v. Labor Commission, 945 P.2d

141 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), and Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial
Commission, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Ct. App. April 30, 1998), this
court explained

that an identical grant of discretion to the

-39-

Industrial

Commission required that the Commission's application of

the law be reviewed under an

"abuse of discretion"

standard.

Therefore, the Labor Commission's application of the law must be
affirmed unless the decision "exceeded the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality."

Osman, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).
There is no way the Commission exceeded the bounds of reasonableness when it ordered that future payments be discounted to
their present value in determining the length of CNA's offset.
stated above, discounting is not a new, radical concept.

As

In fact,

Utah juries are instructed to apply discounting in calculating
future damage awards in civil cases.

MUJI 27.11.

And it was over

eighty years ago that the United States Supreme Court held that
discounting must be applied in calculating damages awarded under
the Federal Employer's' Liability Act, even though the Act did not
expressly provide for discounting.
Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916).

Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v.

The Court in Kelly recognized that

"[i]t is self-evident that a given sum of money in hand is worth
more than the like sum of money payable in the future."
489.

Id. at

The Commission's order, and the regulation on which the order

was based, likewise recognize this basic concept.
Indeed, it would have been error for the Commission not

to

apply discounting, as the Utah Supreme Court has held that discounting must be used when a lump sum payment is made in lieu of
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weekly compensation benefits, even in the absence of a statute or
regulation.

In State Insurance Fund v. Renakf 621 P.2d 714 (Utah

1980) , the employee petitioned the Commission for an advance lumpsum payment of weekly permanent partial disability benefits.
court

held

that

the

Commission

erred

in

refusing

to

The
apply

discounting in granting the petition:
In ordering the lump-sum award, it is obvious that the
$12,000 in hand is more valuable to the defendant Renak
than that same total sum would be if paid to him in
weekly payments, and, conversely, that such requirement
places a greater financial burden upon the plaintiff. It
is our opinion that this was not the intent of Sec. 35-1-

79, but that when a lump sum payment in advance is ordered, there should be a reasonable
and proper
reduction
on an actuarial
basis so that the amount to be paid by
the obligor
will be equal to the present
value of the
extended
payments.
Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
The reasoning of Renak applies here.

The $68,507.97 received

by the Esquivels is certainly worth more "in hand" than it would
have been if spread over the next six years.

And failing to dis-

count would require CNA to pay more than it is obligated to under
the law. When the Esquivels received their tort award, the present
value of CNA's future obligations (through January 5, 2 008) to the
Esquivels was approximately $83,000.

Order, Addendum Exhibit 1,

R. 264.

CNA is entitled to a $68,507.97 offset against this

amount.

Thus, the present value of CNA's remaining obligations

should be around $14,492.

But if the future payments are not

discounted to their present value, CNA will end up paying more than
-41-

this.

Thus, CNA will have been denied the full effect of its

offset.
If CNA and the Esquivels decided to enter into a lump sum
agreement to take care of CNA's entire expected liability, the
regulation is clear that the eight percent discount rate would be
used to determine how much CNA would have to pay to satisfy its
future obligation.

There is no reason why the calculation should

be any different when the lump sum payment is received as a result
of a tort action against a third party.
did not abuse

its discretion

Therefore, the Commission

in ordering

that discounting be

applied in determining the duration of CNA's offset under section
34A-2-106 (5) .

CONCLUSION

Respondents Redd Roofing and Construction Company and CNA
Insurance Company therefore respectfully request that this court
affirm the order of the Labor Commission Appeals Board.
DATED this

I (a

day of

^ A ^

, 1998.

HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE

THEODORE E. KANELL
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
Attorneys for Respondents
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ADDENDUM

1.

Labor Commission Appeals Board Order Granting Motion for
Review, January 14, 1998, R. 262-266.

2.

ALJ's

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Law,

and Order,

February 7, 1997, R. 161-169.
3.

[Respondents'] Motion for Review, March 7, 1997, R. 170-184
(without exhibits).

4.

[Petitioners'] Response to Motion for Review, April 2, 1997,
R. 191-205 (without exhibits).

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988 repl. vol.).

6.

Mathematical Analysis of Petitioners' Proposed Formula.

Exhibit 1

APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
DEPENDANTS OF EDWARD
ESQUIVEL (Deceased),
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Applicants,
*

v.
REDD ROOFING & COMPANY and
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

*

Case No. 96-0670

*
*

Redd Roofing & Company and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, CNA Insurance
Company (referred to collectively as "Redd Roofing" hereafter) ask the Appeals Board of the Utah
Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Redd Roofing is not
entitled to any offset of its liability for benefits payable to the dependents of Edward Esquivel under
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act".)
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
May the proceeds of the Esquivel dependents' third party lawsuit be offset against Redd
Roofing's liability for future dependents' benefits?
FINDINGS OF FACT
On April 26,1993, Mr. Esquivel was killed in an accident while working for Redd Roofing.
At the time of the accident, Mr. Esquivel was using a roof sweeper manufactured by Gravely
International to clean the roof of a building owned by the Freeport Center. Redd Roofing accepted
liability for the dependents' benefits payable under the Act to Mr. Esquivel's children and spouse.
The dependents then commenced a negligence lawsuit against Gravely International.1

1

Prior to their lawsuit against Graveley International, the dependents also brought a
negligence lawsuit against the Freeport Center. The parties have previously agreed to the
disbursement of the proceedsfromthe Freeport Center lawsuit.
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On April 9, 1996, the dependents were awarded damages of $203,507.25 from Gravely
International. After deduction of attorneys fees and costs of $134,999.28, the dependents' net award
was $68,507.97.
Although Redd Roofing has waived its claim to reimbursement for dependents' benefits paid
prior to April 9, 1996, it continues to assert itsrightto offset the net amount of the dependent's third
party award against its liability for future dependents' benefits. As of April 9, 1996, the present value
of Redd Roofing's liability for such future benefits, computed at a discount rate of 8%, was $83,000.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Redd Roofing's right of offset against proceeds of the dependents' third party lawsuit is
governed by §34A-2-106(5) of the Act.2 Section 106(5)(a) provides the method for allocating the
costs and attorneys fees of the third party lawsuit between the dependents and Redd Roofing.
Section 106(5)(b) also establishes the formula for reimbursing Redd Roofing for dependents' benefits
already paid to the dependents. However, Redd Roofing has waived this right to reimbursement.
Finally, §106(5)(c) governs Redd Roofing's right to offset the dependents' third party award against
the future dependents' benefits that Red Roofing would otherwise be required to pay.

2

The full text of subsection 34A-2-106(5) is as follows:

(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it shall be disbursed in accordance with
Subsections (5)(a) through (c).
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer
or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the case of death, by
the dependents, for any recovery had against the third party.
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as follows:
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to the employer, officer, agent, or employee
of the employer in the action against the third party if the combined percentage of fault attributed to
persons immune from suit is determined to be less than 40% prior to any reallocation of fault under
Subsection 78-27-39(2); or
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to the
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the action against the third party if the
combined percentage of fault attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be 40% or
more prior to any reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the employee's heirs in case of death,
to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing against the person liable
for compensation.
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I.

ALLOCATION OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES

Section 106(5)(a) requires that attorneys fees and costs incurred in third party lawsuits be
allocated between the dependents and the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier "as
their interests may appear." In this regard, it is important to note that §106(5)(b) and (c) grant the
first right of reimbursement and offset to the insurance carrier. Because the statute requires that the
employer's interest in the third party award takes precedence over the claimants' interest, Redd
Roofing's share must be determined first. The dependents' share will then be limited to the amount
of the award that remains after Redd Roofing's share has been deducted. The allocation of attorneys'
fees and costs between the parties must reflect the foregoing division.
In this case, the amount of the third party judgment actually available for allocation is
$68,507.97, which represents the amount of the third party judgment after attorneys fees and costs
have been deducted. The present value of Redd Roofing's liability for future dependents' benefits,
to be offset by the third party award, is $83,000 Because Redd Roofing's interest in the award is
more than the net amount of the award itself, Redd Roofing holds the entire interest in the award.
Consequently, all attorneys fees and costs must be allocated to Redd Roofing.
II.

OFFSET AGAINST FUTURE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS

Because Redd Roofing has waived any right to reimbursement under § 106(5)(b) for
dependents' benefits already paid, Redd Roofing's only remaining claim is for use of the third party
award to offset Redd Roofing's future liability for dependents' benefits. This claim to offset is based
on§106(5)(c):
The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the employee's heirs in case of
death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing
against the person liable for compensation.
Under the facts of this case, the plain language of §106(5)(c) requires that the balance of the
dependent's third party award "be applied to reduce" Redd Roofing's liability for dependents' benefits
"thereafter accruing". In this case, Redd Roofing's future liability consists of weekly payments of
$205 to the dependents through the year 2008, at least. Consequently, Redd Roofing is entitled to
use the third party award to offset its obligation to make weekly payments to the dependents, until
such time as the award has been exhausted. Pursuant to the Utah Labor Commission's Rule R612-14, Redd Roofing may determine the extent of its offset by using an 8% discount rate to computing
the present value of its future liability.
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ORDgR
The Appeals Board reverses the decision of the ALT in this matter and grants Redd Roofing's
motion for review. The Appeals Board hereby concludes that Redd Roofing may offset the sum of
$68, 507.97, which is the net amount recovered by the dependents of Mr. Esquivel in their lawsuit
against Gravely International, against Redd Roofing's future liability for workers' compensation
benefits otherwise payable to the dependents. After the amount of $68,507.97 has been fUlly offset
against such future benefits, Redd Roofing must then resume payment of the periodic survivors'
benefits otherwise provided by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. It is so ordered.
Dated this / y d a y of January, 1998.

^ a 2^Colleen Colton, Chair

^i:

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals byfilinga petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion For Review in the matter of
Dependants of Edward Esquivel, Case No.96-0670 was mailed first class postage prepaid this
/ T d a y of January, 1998, to the following:

EDWARD ESQUIVEL, deceased
(Dependants of)
2631 F AVENUE
OGDEN, UTAH 84401

CNA INSURANCE COMPANY
4500 CHERRYCREEK DR SOUTH STE 100
P O BOX 17369 TERMINAL ANNEX
DENVER COLORADO 80217-0369

ROBERT B.SYKES
JAMES D. VILOS
MATTHEW H. RATY
SYKES & VILOS, P.C.
311 SOUTH STATE STREET #240
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

REDD ROOFING COMPANY
PO BOX 1304
OGDEN, UTAH 84402

THEODORE E. KANELL
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C.
4 TRIAD CENTER SUITE 500
POST OFFICE BOX 2970
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-297-

RICHARD K. NEBEKER
2040 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER
36 SOUTH STATE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

IJZTIJWT.

Sara Jensc
Support Specialist
Utah Labor Commission

orders\96-0670
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Exhibit 2

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH
Case No. 96670
DEPENDENTS OF EDWARD ESQUIVEL,
deceased,
*
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner,

*

vs.

*

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

•

REDD ROOFING & COMPANY and
/or CNA INSURANCE CO.,

*
*
*

Respondents.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

BEFORE:

The Honorable
Judge.

Benjamin

A.

Sims,

Presiding

Law

On July 10, 1996, the dependents of Edward Esquivel filed an
Application for Hearing contending that respondents had discontinued workers compensation payments on or about April 1, 1996, and
that no payments have been made since that time. The payments were
to have been $205 per week.
Briefly, the decedent, Edward Esquivel, sustained a fatal
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment with respondent employer on April 26, 1993, at the
Freeport Center in Clearfield, Utah when he fell off one roof and
fell through another roof to his death. The Application stated
that this case involved legal issues only, and that no medical
issues were involved. The respondents agree.
At the time of his death, Mr. Esquivel was earning $14.00 per
hour and was working 40 hours per week. He was married under the
common law and had four dependent children under the age of 18 at
the time of his injury, plus a dependent mother. A Compromise
Settlement of a Disputed Claim was entered into by the dependents
of the deceased, and Redd Roofing and CNA Insurance Companies on
March 2, 1994. The Agreement was approved by a administrative law
judge (law judge) of the Industrial Commission of Utah on March 7,
1994. The Compromise Settlement of Disputed Claim Order provided
that:
1) . . . The applicant shall pay defendants [hereafter
respondents] the lump sum of $8,263.84. This sum represents
payment in full of any lien or subrogation owing to CNA for
death and dependency benefits paid thus far.
Respondents
acknowledge that there is no further claim for offsets, repayment, subrogation or the like, on any amounts paid for
benefits to this point.

EDWARD ESQUIVEL
ORDER
PAGE TWO
2) The decedent7s weekly compensation shall hereafter be $205
per week.
This figure is determined by multiplying the
maximum compensation rate at the time of the accident ($341)
by sixty percent. This shall be the weekly compensation rate
for determining all future benefits to which the surviving
applicants may be entitled,
3) The [respondents] shall pay all dependency benefits to the
surviving applicant pursuant to the Utah Code and applicable
Rules of the Industrial Commission, at the amount set forth in
paragraph two above, for as long as the applicants are
entitled to receive those benefits under the law and rules of
the Commission,
4)
The compensation awarded hereunder shall be paid as
follows:
a)
to Norma Esquivel, for herself, one-fifth of the
amount of the benefits of $205 per week,
b) to Norma Esquivel, for and on behalf of the four
dependent children, and to be used for their support, the
sum of one-fifth of the weekly benefits for each child.
Norma Esquivel shall use those sums for the support of
the children.
c) to Ofelia Herrera, the dependent mother, no sum shall
be paid from these benefits at present because the
parties have agreed that Ofelia will take a significant
share of the third party settlement.
5)
Applicants understand that this is a full and final
settlement.
6) Applicants understand that in accepting this settlement,
they are giving up the right to an administrative hearing at
the Industrial Commission in which an Administrative Law Judge
could give the applicants more money, less money, or no money.
7) Applicants' decision to settle this case is their own. No
one has placed any pressure on the applicants or have
influenced the applicants in this decision.
8)

No attorneys' fee is claimed or awarded.

9) It is the applicants desire that the Administrative Law
Judge approve this settlement.

00162

EDWARD ESQUIVEL
ORDER
PAGE THREE
The Order was approved by Theodore Kanell as attorney for Redd
Roofing and CNA Insurance Company and Robert B. Sykes as attorney
for the applicants.
Respondents admit that there are only legal issues to be
resolved, but deny that the insurance carrier has illegally stopped
paying benefits due to the personal injury settlement. Specifically , the insurance carrier alleges that it has stopped making payments pursuant to the provisions of UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended).
The respondents assert that the petitioners have recovered
substantial sums of money from third party tort feasors and the
respondents state that they are relieved from paying further
benefits as allowed under UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended) until the
petitioners show that they have utilized the third party tort
recovery money in paying for benefits that would be otherwise
receivable under the Workers' Compensation Act.
By way of a separate and affirmative defense, the respondents
state that the petitioners previously entered into a settlement
agreement where the petitioners finalized the settlement with the
third party tort feasor in 1994. This is the same settlement that
was previously discussed in this Order. Further, the settlement
agreement was prepared by petitioners and their attorneys. By the
express language of the settlement agreement, the settlement
agreement only settled issues up to that point in time.
Respondents assert that it was their intent that if the petitioners
recovered money from any third party tort feasors that the
petitioners would be bound by UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended).
In this case, the petitioners filed a lawsuit against a third
party tort feasor named Gravely International. Petitioners did not
tell respondents that they had filed. Petitioners claim that the
omission was inadvertent and certainly unintentional that the
respondents were not informed.
The case went to trial and
petitioners recovered a gross amount of $203,507.25. Respondents
claim that they are entitled to reimbursement of their lien for
payments since the first settlement and are further entitled to be
relieved of any further responsibility for future benefits pursuant
to the statute. Respondents ask that the Industrial Commission
determine how much of an offset shall be granted and make a further
determination as to when payments should be resumed, if at all.
UCA §35-1-62 (3)(a) (1953 as amended) states as follows:
. . . . Before proceeding against the third party, the injured
employee, or, in case of death, his heirs, shall give written
notice of the intention to the carrier and other
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person obligated for the compensation payments, to give the
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the
proceeding.
The settlement agreement previously discussed was filed
against another set of defendants, Freeport Center Associates, a
partnership, and Robert 0'Block and Gordon Olch, partners,
associated in a business in the common name and stock of such
company, James F. Hannan and John Does I through X, and was filed
under Civil Number 930900370 PI in the Second Judicial District
Court of Weber County. This action was ultimately submitted to
nonbinding arbitration or mediation by retired Judge Collin Y.
Christensen. After hearing the evidence for several hours, Judge
Christensen found that the cause of the accident and the
petitioners death were as follows:
Freeport Center - 40%
negligent; Redd Roofing, the employer - 40% negligent and Edward
Esquivel, the deceased - 20% negligent. The settled amount against
these defendants was $375,000.
The liability of the Freeport
Center was noted in the settlement agreement to have been
vigorously contested.
Petitioners' basis for liability was the
claim that Freeport Center, as land owner of the buildings on which
Redd Roofing, an independent contractor was working, should have
responsibility for the safety of Redd Roofing's workers. Based on
the settlement agreement, the parties agreed to compromise and
settle the matter on a full and final basis as follows:
a)
The petitioners pay respondents the sum of $8,263.84.
This sum represents payment in full of any lien or subrogation
owning CNA for death or dependency. Respondents acknowledge
that there is no further claim for offset, re-payment,
subrogation or the like on any amounts paid for benefits to
this point.
b) The decedent's weekly compensation was noted to be $205
per week and this was determined to be the weekly compensation
rate determining all future benefits to which the surviving
petitioners may be entitled.
Respondents argue that subsequent or even during the period
this agreement was being negotiated the petitioners were planning
to sue Gravely International which was the maker of the machine
used to clean the roof of the Freeport Center building in question.
The petitioners deny this and indicate that the arguments show that
they were merely looking into the possibility of suit against
Gravely International.
The petitioners assert that respondents were informed of the
possibility of a third party action on the products liability
issue.
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As evidence for this the petitioners cite to the Compromise
and Settlement of a Disputed Claim between the same parties in the
instant hearing and the related Order of Approval which was
previously discussed. The exhibit which is part of that original
Compromise and Settlement Agreement shows a disbursement sheet with
$10,000 withheld as advanced cost for product liability litigation.
The footnote on that exhibit indicates that there will be an
investigation into the case and that if there is no reasonable
basis to pursue the case, the remaining monies will be disbursed to
the beneficiaries in the same proportions as paid out of the
settlement monies. Thus it appears that there was a possible third
party action that could take place and that the respondents were
informed about it at the time. However, it is also noted that none
of those representing the petitioners felt that there was any great
possibility of additional monies being obtained based on a theory
of product liability.
The petitioners assert that with regard to any amount received
from Gravely International, the 1994 settlement agreement, and the
letter dated March 15, 1994 from Kerry L. Chlarson to Mr. Theodore
Kanell, attorney for respondents in this case shows that " . . .
this check, along with a reduced workers' compensation payment to
Norma Esquivel, completely and fully satisfies any subrogation your
client, CNA Insurance Company, may have had against any settlement
proceeds the Esquivels and Ofelia Herrera may have received from
the Freeport Center or may receive from any other third party."
The federal jury did return a verdict in favor of the
Esquivels, finding total damages in the amount of $814,029.
However, the jury found Gravely International 25 percent at fault.
It apportioned 25 percent of the liability for the fall to Edward
Esquivel and 50 percent to Redd Roofing. Therefore, the Esquivels
were awarded a gross judgment of only 25 five percent of the total
damages or $203,507.25.
With regard to the issues of reimbursement, UCA §3 5-1-62
(5)(b)(ii) (1993 as amended) provides that the amount reimbursable
to the person liable for compensation benefits shall be reduced by
the percentage of fault attributable to "the employer, officer,
agent, or employee of the employer. . . if the combined percentage
of fault attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be
forty percent or more."
In this case, the fault attributable to the employer was 50
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percent.
When Mr. Esquivel's fault as an employee is also
included, that would cause the total fault by which the amount
reimbursable to the insurance carrier to be reduced to 75 percent.
Thus, only 25 percent of the total amount the carrier is liable for
is to be reimbursed to the carrier. UCA §35-1-62 (1993 as amended)
paragraph five requires that, " . . . any recovery obtained against
a third person be disbursed as follows:
(a)
the reasonable
expense of the action, including attorneys fees, shall be paid and
charged proportionately against the parties as their interest may
appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a
credit upon any fee payable to the injured employee or, in the case
of death, to the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
At paragraph B, the statute says that the person liable for
compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in subsection
(5)(a) as follows:
* * *

"(ii)
less the amount of payments made multiplied by the
percentage of fault attributed to the employer, officer,
agent, or employee of the employer in the action against the
third party if the combined percentage of fault attributed to
persons immune from suit is determined to be forty percent or
more prior to any allocation of fault under subsection 78-2739 (2)."
Since the employer had 50 percent fault attributed to him this
paragraph is applicable. CNA has paid $21,320 to the Esquivels in
workers7 compensation benefits since the Freeport Center dispute
was resolved until the day of judgment. CNA is required reasonably
to pay an additional $126,602 in benefits to the Esquivels. CNA is
responsible to pay future benefits based upon benefits being paid
until the youngest child reaches her eighteenth birthday. Prettvman
v. Utah Dept. of Finance, 496 P. 2d 89 (Utah) held that future
payments are included in calculating the interest of the
compensation carrier in a settlement or judgment against a third
party. Including all past, present, and future payments leaves a
total liability of workers compensation benefits for CNA in the
amount of $147,922, making the interest of or exposure to CNA in an
amount of $147,922.
Gravely International was determined by the Federal Court to
be 2 5 percent at fault.
Based upon the statute, reducing the
reimbursement by the percentage of fault attributable to the
employer and his employees (75%), or others immune from suit, the
total amount of reimbursement payable to CNA would be $147,922
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CNA can have no more interest in the judgment received by the
Esquivels than the amount which CNA would have to pay out in
medical expenses, burial expenses, and death benefits. This amount
is $147,922. This is a ceiling on the amount to which CNA has an
interest.
CNA has an interest in the recovery or judgment and its
interest is more accurately stated to be in the net recovery and
not the gross. In other words, CNA's interest is not in the total
amount of $203,507.25, but is only in the net judgment which cannot
be more than $147,922 in any event, and in this case is $203,507.25
minus attorneys' fees and costs. An attorneys' interest in the
judgment is in the fees and costs. CNA's interest is only the
remaining money after fees and costs have been paid as long as it
is less than the ceiling noted. CNA has no claim to the fees or
costs, in fact it has an obligation to contribute to those
expenses. Gross recovery, minus attorneys fees including costs,
equals net recovery.
The gross amount of recovery was $203,507.25.
The gross
amount minus $81,402.90 in attorneys' fees and $53,596.38 in costs
equals $68,507.97.
Therefore, CNA's interest is reduced to
$68,507.97. This amount is the amount which will be received by
the Esquivels after all expenses of trial. Certainly, CNA should
receive no credit for any amount greater than that received by the
Esquivels. If CNA were to receive credit for a greater amount than
$68,507.97, CNA would not be paying its proportionate share of the
expenses as its "interest may appear.11 With regard to the practice
of the parties being charged a set percentage or fraction of the
fee at the conclusion of the trial, it is not in accordance with
the statute which requires the parties to contribute or be given
credit for fees and costs according to their monetary interest in
the case.
In order to calculate CNA's proportionate share of fees, the
first item to be considered is CNA's interest. In this case, CNA
has an interest only in the net recovery since it is less than the
amount which has and will be paid by CNA. The net recovery amounts
to $68,507.25 which is the money available for reimbursement. CNA
is potentially entitled to 100 percent of the available $68,507.25.
Since CNA has a claim for 100 percent of the net recovery, it must
pay 100 percent of the attorneys' fees and costs. The amount of
attorneys' fees and costs is $134,999.28.
Since CNA's
proportionate share of fees and costs is $134,999.28, CNA's lien
must be reduced by that amount. The lien amount credited to CNA is
thus zero since the fees and costs were greatly in excess of the
net amount recovered. CNA is thus not given credit for any offset
or reimbursement. This formula is somewhat more complicated than
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simple, but improper formula used to compute proportionate shares
of fees and costs. It was evidently the intent of the legislature
to require the party obligated to pay workers' compensation to contribute the proportion of the share of fees and costs representing
the proportion of the monetary interest that party has in the
outcome of the case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Under UCA §35-1-62(5) (1993 as amended), it is determined that
CNA's proportionate amount of costs and fees is $134,999.28 and
CNA's lien must be reduced by that amount. Since the total amount
of CNA's lien is only $68,507.97, CNA is not entitled to any
reimbursement from the third party action against Gravely
International.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Redd Roofing and or CNA Insurance
shall pay $205 per week, in accordance with the Compromise
Settlement of a Disputed Claim and Order of Approval dated March 7,
1994 with interest from April 2, 1996.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be received by the Commission in writing within
thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections, and, unless so received, this
Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. In the
event a Motion for Review is timely received, the parties shall
have fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt by the Commission,
in which to file a written response with the Commission in
accordance with Section 63-46b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated.
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/

day of / <£^^*~^/

, 1997

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DEPENDENTS OF EDWARD ESQUIVEL,
Deceased,

*

*

MOTION FOR REVIEW OF ORDER

Applicants,
*

REDD ROOFING & CONSTRUCTION
CO., and CNA INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.

*

*
*

C a s e No.

96670

*
*

Come now the defendants, Redd Roofing, Inc., and CNA Insurance
Company, through their counsel of record, and file this Motion for
Review of the Order dated February 7, 1997, entered by Judge
Benjamin A. Sims in the above-captioned matter.
INTRODUCTION
This action involves the apportionment of proceeds recovered
in a third-party tort action. In 1994, CNA Insurance Company began
paying weekly death benefits to the dependents of Edward Esquivel,
who had died in a work-related accident while employed by Redd
Roofing.

But in 1996, the Esquivels received over sixty-eight

thousand dollars in a tort action against a third party, Gravely
International.

On February 7, 1997, the Honorable Benjamin A.
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Sims, administrative law judge, entered an Order p^bvidin^ that/CtiA
was not entitled to any reimbursement or credit against its future
payments to the Esquivels.1

However, section 35-1-62 (!)) (jc) of the

Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires that any money recovered in
a third-party tort action by the dependents of an injured employee
must be applied to reduce or satisfy the workers' compensation
insurer's future obligations.

Therefore, CNA now respectfully

requests that the Order be set aside, and that the money recovered
by the Esquivels be used to reduce CNA's obligations to make future
weekly benefit payments.
FACTS
On April 26, 1993, the decedent, Edward Esquivel, sustained a
fatal injury when he fell off a roof while working for defendant
Redd Roofing, Inc., who was insured by defendant CNA Insurance
Company.

CNA

began

paying

benefits

to

his

dependents

(the

Esquivels). In 1994, the Esquivels received $375,000 from Freeport
Center Associates, the owner of the building in which the accident
happened.

The Esquivels and CNA then entered into an agreement in

which CNA agreed to pay $205 per week for as long as the dependents
were entitled to receive death benefits under the workers' compensation law.2

The decedent's youngest child will turn eighteen on

January 5, 2008.

CNA also agreed to accept $8,263.84 to satisfy

*A copy of this Order is attached as Exhibit 1.
2

This figure represents the statutory maximum rate at the time
of the accident, $341, times sixty percent.

>

>

>>>

its workers' compensation lien rights that had ^£crued; up Mritil
that

point.

This

agreement

was

approved

by

the

Commission on March 7, 1994.

Industrial
; ; ^

The Esquivels then pursued another third-party tort action,
against Gravely International, the maker of the roof-sweeper that
Mr. Esquivel was using when the accident occurred.

However, the

Esquivels failed to notify CNA that they were pursuing this other
action, and they failed to notify CNA that Gravely was attempting
to attribute a portion of the fault to the employer.

This failure

to notify CNA violated subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b) of Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-62.
In the action against Gravely, the jury found that the total
damages were

$814,029, and

fault was apportioned

as follows:

twenty-five percent to Gravely, fifty percent to Redd Roofing, and
twenty-five percent to Edward Esquivel.

Therefore, on April 9,

1996, Judge Tena Campbell entered an order awarding the Esquivels
$203,507.25.

The costs of pursuing this action were $53,596.38,

and the attorneys' fees amounted to $81,402.90.

Thus, the amount

to be disbursed after the costs and fees were paid was $68,507.97.
After the judgment was entered, CNA stopped making the weekly
payments, because the Workers' Compensation Act provides that a
workers' compensation insurer has a right of reimbursement and
future credit for any money recovered by an injured employee or his
dependents.

CNA's most recent payment was made on March 27, 1996,

covering the period through April 1, 1996.

From the time of the

-3-
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1994 settlement agreement until March 27, 1996; ,X:NA hrid paid i a
total of $21,320.
>)> >
>
>>

The applicants then brought this action seeking >aji order
>> >

requiring

CNA

to

continue

making

the

$205

weekly

>

payments,

notwithstanding that the applicants had just received the money in
their tort action against Gravely.

CNA has opposed, because

section 35-1-62(5) provides that (1) CNA is entitled to at least
partial reimbursement for amounts paid the Esquivels so far, and
(2) any remaining amounts recovered by the Esquivels must be
applied

to

Esquivels.

satisfy

or reduce

CNA's

future obligation

to

the

On February 7, 1997, the Honorable Benjamin A. Sims,

administrative law judge, entered an Order providing that the
Esquivels were entitled to keep the entire $68,507.97, but CNA was
not entitled to any reimbursement or offset or reduction in its
future obligations.

The Order thus requires CNA to continue to

make weekly payments of $205 to the Esquivels.
CNA hereby seeks review of the Order of February 7, 1997. The
Order incorrectly requires CNA to continue to make weekly payments
to the Esquivels, even though the Esquivels received $68,507.97
from their tort action.

The Order addresses several complex

questions, but regardless of these issues, there is one inescapable
fact:

the Esquivels ended up with the money.

Under section 35-1-

62(c)(5) of the Utah Code, any money recovered by a deceased
employee's dependents must be applied to reduce or satisfy the
workers'

compensation

insurer's

future

obligations

to

the
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Moreover, when the $68,507.97 is audited; to CWAfs

future obligations, accounting principles and Industrial Commission
regulations require that those future payments must bej accounted
to their present value in order to determine how many payments are
represented by the lump sum.

As discussed in more detail belowf a

$68,507.97 lump sum today, invested at eight percent interest, is
sufficient to make four hundred sixty weekly payments of $205.
Therefore, CNA respectfully requests that a new order be entered
providing that CNA is not required to resume making weekly payments
to the Esquivels until January 23, 2005.
GOVERNING STATUTE
This case is controlled entirely by subsection (5) of Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-62. This subsection provides as follows:
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it
shall be disbursed as follows:
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including
attorneys'
fees,
shall
be
paid
and
charged
proportionately against the parties as their interests
may appear.
Any fee chargeable to the employer or
carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the
injured employee or, in the case of death, by the
dependents, for any recovery had against the third party.
(b) The person liable for compensation payments
shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate share of
costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection
(5)(a), for the payments made as follows:
(i) without
reduction
based
on
fault
attributed to the employer, officer, agent, or employee
of the employer in the action against the third party if
the combined percentage of fault attributed to persons
immune from suit is determined to be less than 40% prior
to any reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-2739(2); or
-5-
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(ii) less
the
amount
of
payty^nts Jnade,,' '
multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to the
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in
the action against the third party if the combined
percentage of fault attributed to persons immunje jfi^om
suit is determined to be 40% or more prior to any
reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be applied to
reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter
accruing against the person liable for compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5) (1994 repl. vol.).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE BALANCE RECOVERED BY THE ESQUIVELS IS TO BE APPLIED TO
REDUCE CNA'S FUTURE OBLIGATIONS TO THE ESQUIVELS, SO CNA IS
NOT REQUIRED TO RESUME MAKING PAYMENTS UNTIL JANUARY 23, 2005.
A.

Section 35-1-62(5)(c) requires that any balance remaining
after fees, costs, and reimbursement must be used to
reduce or satisfy the workers' compensation insurer's
future liability to the injured employee or his
dependents.

The distribution of proceeds recovered from a tort action
against a third party is governed by subsection 35-1-62(5) of the
Utah Code, set forth above.

Under subsection (5)(a), proceeds of

an action against a third party are first to be used to pay the
reasonable expenses of the action.

Next, under subsection (5)(b),

the person liable for compensation payments must be reimbursed,
less its share of fees and costs, though this reimbursement is to
be reduced by the employer's proportionate fault.

For purposes of

this argument, however, we will assume that CNA is not entitled to
any reimbursement because the costs and fees of the tort action far
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The final stsp in>tiie

distribution is directed by subsection (5)(c), which g^oyides,
> >

(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured emplc>yete,or
his heirs in case of death, to be applied
to retiuce
or
satisfy
in full
any obligation
thereafter
accruing
against
the person liable
for
compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5)(c) (emphasis added).

In other words,

after the fees and costs have been paid, and after any reimbursement has been taken care of, any money left over is to be paid to
the injured employee or his dependents, but the workers' compensation insurer is entitled to a setoff against its future payments.
In the tort action against Gravely International, the gross
recovery was $203,507.25. After the attorneys' fees and costs were
paid, there was a remaining balance of $68,507.97. This amount is
left over, regardless of how much the reimbursement amount is
reduced,3 and regardless of how the costs and fees are apportioned.

3

The reduction of CNA's reimbursement share is ultimately
irrelevant, because any amount not reimbursed becomes part of the
remaining balance, which is to be applied to reduce CNA's future
obligations as provided by subsection (5)(c). But if it becomes an
issue, the percentage of fault attributable to Edward Esquivel
(25%) should not be included in the fault attributable to the
employer when calculating the percentage by which CNA's
reimbursement should be reduced under section 35-1-62(5)(b)(ii).
The phrase "officer, agent, or employee of the employer" does not
include the decedent. Throughout section 35-1-62, whenever the
statute intends to refer to the employee who suffered the accident,
it uses the phrase "injured employee." Thus CNA would be entitled
to be reimbursed $10,660, which is the amount of payments it has
already made ($21,320) reduced by Redd Roofing's proportionate
share of fault (50%). But because any remaining balance is to be
applied to CNA's future obligations anyway, CNA waives its right to
reimbursement, as long as the balances are applied in accordance
with the governing statute.
-7-
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The Order is correct in holding that the money should go to»tiie
Esquivelsf but the plain language of the statute estaj^isjies that
CNA is entitled to be substantially relieved of its lJJabiL.\ity for
future weekly payments.
The Order incorrectly concluded that CNA was not entitled to
be relieved from any of its future payments.

It appears that this

mistake occurred because the administrative law judge got caught up
in the issues and calculations and inadvertently subtracted the
costs

and

fees of the tort

action twice.

In the

paragraph

beginning at the bottom of page sixf the Order notes that the gross
recovery was $203,507.25, but the attorneys' fees were $81,402.90,
and the costs were $53,596.38. Consequently, the net recovery was
$68f507.97.

The Order

states, "Therefore, CNA's interest

is

reduced to $68,507.97." However, in the next paragraph, the Order
reasons because CNA is responsible for one hundred percent of the
fees and costs, or $134,999.28, that amount should be taken out of
the $68,507.97, leading to the conclusion that CNA's lien is
reduced to zero. Thus the Order provided that CNA was not entitled
to any reimbursement or offset against its future liability.
This result is illogical and violates section 35-1-62.

As

demonstrated above, the error here is that the fees and costs were
subtracted twice:

the fees and costs were subtracted from the

gross recovery to determine the $68,507.97 "net proceeds" in the
paragraph beginning at the bottom of page six, and the fees and
costs were again subtracted from the $68,507.97 to reduce CNA's
-8-
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The end result of this error is that the fasquiveis

received all the benefit of the recovery, but CNA did^ijot^ receive
any reimbursement or setoff against its future obligatjiohs.
The reasoning in the Order is rather complex; it addresses
several issues, such as the proper reduction of CNA's reimbursement, the calculation of each party's "interest" in the action, and
whether the fees and costs should be taken from the gross recovery
or net recovery.

However, it is unnecessary to address these

issues, because one simple, undisputed fact persists:
dust settles, there is still $68,507.97 remaining!

when the
This money

remains regardless of the outcome of the other questions.

The

issue in this case, then, is simply what happens to that money. As
set forth above, section 35-1-62(5) plainly describes what is
supposed to happen to the leftover money:

after the costs, fees,

and reimbursement are taken care of, the remaining balance goes to
the Esquivels, to be applied to reduce or satisfy CNA's future
obligations.
Because CNA will receive the benefit of the entire amount
recovered from Gravely, we concede that CNA is responsible to pay
all the attorney fees and costs.4

We also concede for present

4

This assumes that section 35-1-62(5)(c) will be followed, and
the $68,507.97 remaining will be applied to reduce CNA's future
obligations. If not, however, then CNA is not responsible for the
entire amount of attorney fees, but only for an amount in proportion to the actual benefit it receives. Moreover, in deducting
fees and costs, the amounts have to be taken from the
gross
recovery. See, e.g., Graham v. Industrial Commission, 26 Utah 2d
424, 491 P.2d 223, 224 (1971) ("the net award to the plaintiff
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purposes that the fees and costs are reasonable, and that? the > fees
and costs can be taken out of CNA's reimbursementf inst^^d ,of being
apportioned between CNA's reimbursement and the bala&co >due the
Esquivels.5

But the fees and costs must be subtracted from the

gross proceeds, not the net proceeds. Taking the amount out of the
net proceeds would be incorrect because, by the very definition,
the "net proceeds" are what is left over after
have already been paid.
paid out of the gross

the fees and costs

Because the fees and costs are in reality
recovery, the proportionate shares of the

fees and costs have to be taken from the gross recovery.

The

correct calculation is much simpler:
Gross recovery:

$203,507.25

CNA's share of fees and costs:

$134,999.28

Balance remaining

$ 68,507.97

But as explained above, there is no real need to get caught up
in these issues.

All that ultimately matters is that, no matter

how the calculations are made, there is a balance of $68,507.97
would be the amount of the total expenses multiplied by a fraction,
the numerator of which would be the award and the denominator of
which would be the $95,000 [the amount of the settlement
before
fees and costs were deducted], less any amount heretofore paid to
plaintiff.").
See also Cameron v. Minidoka County Highway
District, 874 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Idaho 1994).
5

Again, this assumes that the $68,507.97 will be applied to
CNA's future obligations. If not, CNA argues that the costs and
fees are not reasonable, and that the costs and fees should be
charged proportionally to the amount of its reimbursement and the
balance going to the Esquivels.
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remaining after the costs and fees have been paicL' The Esquivels
are entitled to recover this amount, but it must be u s ^ t,o offset
CNA's future obligation to pay workers' compensation benefits.
Otherwise, the Esquivels would be receiving a double recovery:
they would receive the entire $68,507.97, and they would continue
to receive weekly payments for the next eleven years.

Thus, the

Order violates the unambiguous language of 35-1-62(5)(c).

CNA

therefore requests that the Order be set aside, and that the
$68,507.97 be applied to reduce CNA's future obligations to the
Esquivels.
B.

The amount of CNA's future obligations should be .
discounted to present value in determining the amount of
CNA's credit.

The Esquivels received the judgment for $68,507.97 on April 9,
1996, to be applied to satisfy CNA's obligation to make
payments.

future

CNA's obligation under the workers' compensation law is

to pay $205 per week until approximately January 5, 2008.

But

under basic principles of accounting, $205 paid on, say, March 7,
1997, is worth substantially more than $205 due to be paid on
March 7, 2007.6

Therefore, in determining the number of weekly

payments represented by the $68,507.97 recovered in 1996, the
amount of each future weekly payment must be discounted to its

6

At the eight percent discount rate provided by Rule R568-111, a $205 payment due in ten years is worth $94.96 today.
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present value.
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CNA should then be given credit for the number' of

discounted weekly payments that can be made from $68,507^97.
Discounting is required under the Industrial C>oirinAss ion's
regulations.

These regulations provide that when a lump sum

payment is made to satisfy future weekly obligations, the future
payments shall be discounted using a rate of eight percent.

Rule

R568-1-11 provides that
Eight percent shall be used for any discounting or
present value calculations. Lump sums ordered by the
Commission of any permanent partial benefit award . . .
or of any other sum being paid earlier
than normally
paid
under a weekly benefit
method shall be subject to the 8%
discounting.
(Emphasis added.)

In our case, the Esquivels have received a lump

sum of $68,507.97, which was paid earlier than it would normally be
paid under the weekly benefit method.

Therefore Rule R568-1-11

applies, and each future payment must be discounted to its present
value to determine how much that payment is "worth" today.

Each

discounted future weekly payment should then be subtracted from the
balance, until the $68,507.97 is exhausted.

CNA should be given

credit for that number of future payments, and it should resume
paying $205 per week after that number of weeks has expired.
Instead
payment

CNA

of calculating
was

scheduled

the present value of each weekly
to

make

(from April

9,

1996, to

January 5, 2008, is approximately 613 weeks), the effect of the
lump sum on CNA's future payments can be determined by calculating
the future

value of the $68,507.97 lump sum.
-12-

That is, it is

relatively easy to calculate how many weekly payments couid be^macie
from the lump sum if the lump sum were invested and earji^d interest
>

at the discount rate.

>

>

The theory behind discounting o.s^that the

person who receives the lump sum will invest the money, which will
earn interest throughout the time in which periodic payments should
be made.

And according to the accounting firm of Mann, Weitz and

Associates, L.L.C., of Deerfield, Illinois, a $68,507.97 lump sum,
received on April 9, 1996, earning interest at the prescribed rate
of eight percent per year, will be sufficient to make 460 weekly
payments of $205 per week.
Four hundred sixty weeks translates to approximately eight
years and forty-three weeks.

Because CNA's last payment was made

on March 27, 1996, its next payment should not be due until January
23, 2005.

At that time CNA should resume making its payments at

$205 per week, for as long as any of Edward Esquivel's dependents
are

entitled

to

receive

death

benefits

under

the

Workers'

Compensation Act.
If CNA and the Esquivels decided to enter into a lump sum
agreement to take care of CNA's entire expected liability, the
regulation is clear that the eight percent discount rate would be
used to determine how much CNA would have to pay today to satisfy
its entire future obligation.7

There is no reason why the cal-

7

In fact, even if the Esquivels had not recovered the money in
their tort action, CNA could pay off its entire future obligation,
through January 5, 2008, with a lump sum payment of $83,000.
-13-

culation should be any different when the lump • sum payment: is
received as a result of a tort action against a third,,party.
>

The

>

practice of discounting has nothing to do with the sciirio of the
lump

sum

payment;

it

is merely

a

realization

of

the

basic

accounting principle that a given sum of money is more valuable
today than it will be in the future.
Even without discounting, the $68,507.97 recovery by the
Esquivels is enough to make 334 payments of $205.

Thus, at a

minimum, CNA should not be required to make another payment until
approximately
Commission's

August

21,

regulations,

2002.
as

However,

well

as

basic

the

Industrial

principles

accounting, require that the future payments be discounted

of
in

calculating the effect of the lump sum recovered by the Esquivels.
Therefore, CNA's

future

payments

to the Esquivels

should

be

discounted to their present value, and CNA should not be required
to resume making weekly payments to the Esquivels until January 23,
2005.
CONCLUSION
CNA therefore respectfully requests that Judge Sims' Order of
February 7, 1997, be set aside, and that a new order be issued,
that CNA is not required to make weekly payments to the Esquivels
until January 23, 2005.
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EDWARD ESQUIVEL, deceased,
NORMA ESQUIVEL, RICHARD
ESQUIVEL, ANGEL ESQUIVEL,
EDICA ESQUIVEL and OFELIA
HERRERA,

)
)
)
)
)

Applicants,

APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
REVIEW OF ORDER

)

v.

)

REDD ROOFING &
CONSTRUCTION CO., and CNA
COMPANY,

Case No. 96670

)
)
)

Defendants.

)

Applicants, by and through their counsel of record, file this Response to the
Defendants' Motion for Review of Order. Administrative Law Judge Benjamin A. Sims
entered an order dated February 7,1997. On March 7,1997, the defendants filed a Motion
for Review. By stipulation, defendants granted Applicants leave to file their response by
Wednesday, April 2, 1997.
INTRODUCTION
The issues to be decided in this Motion for Review involve the distribution
of proceeds generated from a judgment entered in an action filed by the Applicants against
- 1-
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a third party who was found liable for the death of the Applicants' l^band, father and son.
Specifically, the question is whether the Admirii^rative Law Judge correctly apportioned the
fees and costs involved in bringing the third party lawsuit The Administrative Law Judge
followed the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 35-lT52(5)^and apportioned the assessment
of the attorneys fees and costs for recovering a third-party judgment based upon the
proportional interests of the parties. The defendants objected and insisted that the attorneys
fees and costs should be apportioned based upon a fiction, or as though plaintiffs had
recovered the entire amount of the $203,000 judgment, without taking into account the
attorneys fees and costs actually incurred. In the alternative, defendants requested that only
a set percentage or fraction of the fee be assessed against it, in essence asking the
Commission to totally disregard the statutory language of § 35-1-62(5). The defendants had
earlier requested that the Applicants "settle" for a payment of $40,000 to write off a
$147,000 obligation. The Administrative Law Judge declined to disregard § 35-1-62(5), as
requested by defendants, and proceeded to apportion the attorneys fees and costs as set
forth in the order.
The Order of the Administrative Law Judge accurately reflects the agreement
of the parties that this dispute involves only questions of law as the parties stipulated to the
essential facts of the case. For the purpose of providing an adequate factual background
to this dispute, we state the following:
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FACTS
,
j

1.

>
>

>
>

>

i

>

*

>
'

On April 26, 1993, EdwaWI Esquivel thefoqsljand,father and son1 of

the Applicants, was killed while working on a roof at the Freeport Center for Redd Roofing
Construction Company (Redd Roofing). The CNA ^nsjirpnce Company (CNA) was the
worker's compensation carrier for Redd Roofing at the time of Mr. EsquiveFs death. The
Applicants were dependent upon the decedent at the time of his death. Therefore, CNA
began paying the statutorily-required benefits to the Applicants.
I

2.

In 1994, the Applicants, with the consent of CNA, entered into a

settlement with the Freeport Center, a third party who the Applicants felt was responsible
i for the death of Edward Esquivel. The settlement was for $375,000. The amount of
i

I reimbursement and offset to which CNA was entitled was disputed then, as it is now.
i

However, the Applicants and CNA were able to reach a negotiated settlement.

The

I
I settlement resulted in the Applicants reimbursing CNA $8,263.84, and a forty percent (40%)
I reduction in weekly benefits, from $341 per week to $205 per week.
3.

The settlement agreement with CNA reflected that $10,000 from the

settlement with the Freeport Center was set aside for the investigation and possible lawsuit
J against Gravely International (Gravely), the manufacturer of the machine Mr. Esquivel was
I using at the time of his death. Exhibit A, p. 9. CNA was informed of this investigation,
even though at the time there was little evidence that the machine was defective.2
1

Norma Esquivel was the deceased's wife. At the time of Edwards death, he had four minor children Kdward
Jr., Richard, Angel and Edica. Ofelia Herrera was his totally dependent mother.
I

2

Whether or not CNA was informed of the lawsuit by the Applicants is disputed, but that issue is m , devant
to this Motion for Review. In any event, it is undisputed that CNA was aware of the lawsuit filed by the Applica** v i gainst
Gravely International, the manufacturer of the machine, in plenty of time to protect its interests. This is esta
hed by
the fact that CNA's attorney, Ted Kanell, participated in a deposition months before the case went to trial. >». Exhibit
I B, deposition of CNA investigator, Brad Bennett.
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4.

>

>
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I

Several facts demonstrate that CNA was botfr ^ware that Applicants

were pursuing a third-party action and that GMvely was *atteiqpt»ig to attribute a portion
of fault to the employer. First of all, CNA undertook, an investigation of the original
accident in 1993, taking numerous pictures and, statements.

This information wad

subpoenaed by both sides during the litigation. The investigator was deposed, and the
deposition was vigorously defended by Mr. Kanell, the attorney for CNA. The tenure of the
questions at the deposition by the third-party defense counsel, Mr. Kanell's sophistication
in personal injury matters, as well as several conversations with counsel for the Applicants,
indicated to Mr. Kanell that Gravely was claiming that the employer was negligent. It would
have been patently obvious to any defense attorney that such a claim would be made in ai
case where an untethered employee was using heavy equipment near the edge of a roof with
the approval of the supervisor, and subsequently fell to his death.
5.

A lawsuit was eventually filed against Gravely International, the

manufacturer of the machine Mr. Esquivel was operating at the time of his death. The case
was tried to a jury in March, 1996. On April 9, 1996, Judge Tena Campbell entered a
judgment awarding the Applicants $203,507.25. The jury found the total damages to be
$814,029, but apportioned fault between Gravely International, Mr. Esquivel, and Redd
Roofing. The jury found that Gravely International was only twenty-five percent (25%)
responsible for the death of Mr. Esquivel, so judgment was entered for only $203,507.25.
Mr. Esquivel was also found to be twenty-five percent (25%) at fault. However, the jury
found Redd Roofing, the employer, to be fifty percent (50%) at fault. Mr. Kanell attended
several sessions of the trial.
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6.

The attorneys' fees in the third party action were $81,402.90. The out- j

of-pocket costs of the action were $53,596.38.1 >Thiis, thq total di? attorneys' fees and costs |
was $134,999.28.
7.

As soon as the verdict was reached, CNA stopped sending the weekly

worker's compensation benefit payments to the Applicants.
8.

From the time of the negotiated settlement between CNA and the j

Applicants regarding the settlement with the Freeport Center in 1994 until CNA stopped
making weekly payments, CNA had paid $21,320 to the Applicants.
9.

Attempts were made to resolve the issue of reimbursement and offset

with CNA but they proved futile. Therefore, the Applicants filed a Request for Hearing to |
let an Administrative Law Judge decide how much reimbursement and offset CNA was to
receive.
10.

A hearing was held before the Honorable Benjamin A. Sims. He issued

his decision entitled "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order" on February 7, i
1997. Exhibit C. Judge Sims decided that CNA was not entitled to any reimbursement or I
offset. CNA then filed a Motion for Review of Order. This Memorandum is in response
to that Motion.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Judge Sims correctly determined that CNA's proportional share of fees and
costs was 100%.

Furthermore, Judge Sims correctly concluded that, since CNA's

proportionate share of fees and costs exceeded the amount of money available for
reimbursement and offset, CNA was not entitled to any reimbursement or offset.
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Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5) provides the method for determining how
,
> > >

> >
> '
) > > > »

j

proceeds collected from a liable third party are3 iq be divided between the injured employee
or his dependents and the entity responsible for worker's compensation benefits. Judge
Sims relied upon this statute in making his decision regarding CNA's right to reimbursement
and offset.

CNA disagrees with Judge Sims' application of that statute to this case.

However, Judge Sims correctly applied the statute to the facts and reached the correct
decision.
POINT I
JUDGE SIMS USED THE CORRECT MATHEMATICAL
FORMULA TO DETERMINE CNA'S PROPORTIONATE
SHARE OF COSTS AND FEES.
In order to determine CNA's proportionate share of fees and costs as required
by the statute, Judge Sims applied a simple mathematical formula. Interest / available
money = proportionate share.

A simple example of this mathematical formula

demonstrates the correctness of it. Suppose $100 is placed on a table. Suppose that $50
of that $100 is CNA's. CNA's interest in that $100 is $50. CNA's interest / available money
= proportionate share shows CNA's proportionate share to be 1/2 or 50% (50/100=1/2).
Therefore, if it cost $10 in order to retrieve the $100 from the table, CNA's proportionate
share of that cost would be the cost times its proportionate share ($10 x 50%), or $5.00.
Determining CNA's "interest'' is crucial to the outcome of this Motion for
Review. Under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5), the distribution of monies received in a
lawsuit against a third person can only be determined by first determining the "interest" of
the employer or insurance carrier. The proportionate interests of the parties determine how
much of the attorneys' fees and costs will be charged to the respective parties. Accordingly,
-6-
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the statute requires that "the reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
]

> »

> >

»

shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as iHeir interests may appear." \
(emphasis added) Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-63(5)(a).

I

The "fee chargeable to the employer oi> carrier" is a "credit" upon "any fee
payable by the injured employee . . . for any recovery had against the third party." Id. j
Therefore, CNA's proportionate share of attorneys' fees and costs, based upon its "interest," |
is to be deducted from the attorneys' fees and costs paid by the Applicants, as a "credit."
In other words, CNA pays that portion of the Applicants' attorneys' fees and costs as i
determined by the proportion of its "interest" as compared to the Applicants' interest. I
Depending upon the size of the judgment or settlement, it is certainly possible that the j
Applicants' "interest" could be far greater than CNA's "interest." It is also possible, j
depending upon the outcome at trial, that the Applicants would receive a small amount |
compared to a large interest by the carrier. Therefore, the formula certainly contemplates I
a wide panoply of situations, one of which is a 100% charge of attorneys' fees and costs to i
the employer or carrier.

|

In order to use this formula, Judge Sims first calculated the "interest" of CNA j
in the third party lawsuit.

He determined that CNA's interest was equal to its total
i

obligation.

As so forcefully noted by CNA in its Motion for Review, the worker's |
i

compensation carrier is entitled to reimbursement before any money is given to the injured |
employee. CNA also pointed out that any money received by an injured employee from a i
liable third party would offset any future obligation the carrier may have to make weekly |
benefit payments. Therefore, Judge Sims properly determined that since CNA could, under
appropriate circumstances, receive all of the available money from the judgment in the form
-7-
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>
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>

>

>

of reimbursement or offset before any benefit would be received by,tie Applicants, CNA's
maximum possible "interest" in the judgment'amounted; tQ its^Otrfl obligation.
Judge Sims determined that CNA hac^pajd the Applicants $21,320 since
>
>

>>
>

March, 1994, the date of the previous settlement^ .He/also calculated that CNA wad
obligated to make payments of $205 per week at least until the 18th birthday of the
youngest child of Mr. Esquivel, which amount to a total of $126,602. These amounts are
undisputed.

The Judge therefore concluded that the maximum possible amount ofl

reimbursement and offset available to CNA was $147,922 ($21,320 + $126,602 = $147,922).
Since CNA was entitled to $147,922 in reimbursement and /or offset before the Applicants
would receive any benefit, Judge Sims corrected decidedly that CNA's maximum possible
"interest" in the third party lawsuit was $147,922.
Next the Judge decided that only $68,507.97 was available for distribution to
Applicants from the lawsuit. This was the amount of money left after the fees and costs had
been subtracted from the actual judgment. The judgment was for $203,507.25, the fees were
$81,402.90, and the costs were $53,596.38. The decision to use the net judgment instead ofl
the gross judgment was based upon the fact that the attorney is the only one who has an
interest in the fees and costs once it has been determined what that amount is going to be.
The Applicants could receive only the money available after fees and costs had been
deducted or $68,507.97.
The statutory requirement is that the employer be "charged proportionately"
its share of attorneys' fees and costs as "the parties . . . interests may appear."
proportional formula showing the interests of the parties is as follows:
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A

CNA's interest -

$147,922.00

Available money -

$ 68,^7.97

,>' ' '' i J'

Applying the simple mathematical formula described above to determine CNA's
> > >

»

proportionate share of fees and costs demonstrates that CNA's possible interest exceeds the
available money ($147,922 / $68,507.97). Since CNA cannot have an interest greater than
the money available, the Judge properly reduced CNA's interest to $68,507.97, or the total j
available money. CNA's Interest / Money available ($68,507.97 / $68,507.97) shows that |
CNA's proportionate share of fees and costs is equal to 100%.

I

The Administrative Law Judge's Order correctly concluded that the
Defendants were 100% liable for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of the |
lawsuit against Gravely International. See, Breen v. Caesars Palace, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nev.

t

1986) (allocating the parties respective shares of fees and costs based on net settlement
proceeds), attached as Exhibit D. See also, Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d \
I

223, (Utah 1967) (ruling insurer's reimbursement is made from funds remaining after |
litigation fees and costs have been satisfied).

I

POINT II

I

JUDGE SIMS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT SINCE
CNA'S PROPORTIONAL SHARE OF FEES AND COSTS
EXCEEDED THE AMOUNT OF MONEY AVAILABLE FOR
REIMBURSEMENT OR OFFSET, CNA WAS NOT ENTITLED
TO ANY REIMBURSEMENT OR OFFSET.

'
|
j
|

The real issue in this case is how CNA's share of fees and costs affects its right
to reimbursement, and especially offset. CNA argues that its share of fees and costs only
affects reimbursement, and that any money from the lawsuit which actually makes its way j
into the hands of the Applicants must be offset against any future obligation it has to pay i
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worker's compensation benefits. This approach is contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5),
,

,

>

> >>

as well as unfair to the Applicants. What C&4 lias dotfe in ii$ Hrief is basically to cite
portions of the statute selectively and out of context, ignoring the context of the entire
>

subsection 5, which supports the Applicants.

>>

J

, { ,

If CNA's approach is implemented in this case, it would mean that the
Applicants risked the costs of the lawsuit and suffered the mental anguish and difficulties
plaintiffs must endure all for the benefit of CNA.

CNA on the other hand would end up

with a $68,507.97 windfall, having risked nothing and having done nothing to get it. The
best way to illustrate this point is to determine how much money the Applicants would have
received in the form of worker's compensation benefits versus how much money they would
get if CNA has its way. Judge Sims calculated the total obligation of CNA to the Applicants
to be $147,922. This amount reflects the money CNA would have paid had no lawsuit been
brought. Applicants, of course, would receive this sum.
Using the approach advocated by CNA, Applicants would receive only
$127,342, or $20,000 less than if they had not brought suit: $21,320 (payments already
made) + $68,507.97 (money from the lawsuit) + $37,515 (future obligation for weekly
payment of $205 from 1/23/2005 to 1/5/2008) for a total of $127,342.97. The Applicants in
reality would have been better off not to have brought the lawsuit at all even though they
got a judgment for $203,507.25. This demonstrates the absurdity of CNA's position.
Furthermore, CNA's position is not in conformity with Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-62(5) which requires that M[a]ny fee chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a
credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or in case of death, by the dependents, for
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any recovery had against the third party." (emphasis added) Since CNA's share of the fees
> >

> > > > >

and costs was $134,999.28, the Applicants arefctttitledto. & "credit'> for that amount.
The total amount of money available to the Applicants from the lawsuit is
>

>

>

$68,507.97. Therefore, Applicants are required to pay CNA a reimbursement and offset
equal to $68,507.97 (the total amount of the judgment available to the Applicants) minus |
CNA's proportional share of costs and fees. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-62(5)(b) ("The |
person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less proportionate share of |
t

costs and attorneys' fees ...") The Applicants cannot possibly be required to pay more than I
the net judgment. However, since the $68,507.97 (total amount of available money) - J
$134,999.28 (CNA's proportional share of costs and fees) = less than zero, CNA is entitled ]
to no money.

|
CNA claims that the fees and costs have been paid twice when the method I

employed by Judge Sims is applied. However, that is not true. The court ordered the third
party defendant, Gravely International, to pay the Applicants $203,507.25. Of that amount,
the Applicants paid $134,999.28 to the attorneys for fees and costs. That money paid by the |
Applicants for fees and costs by statute is not to be used to determine how much money an
injured employee must reimburse a worker's compensation carrier or how much offeet is |
available to that carrier. However, the statute provides that an employer or carrier must pay |
I
its proportionate share of those fees and costs as a credit to an injured employee for |
payment already made.
j
In other words, the worker's compensation carrier must reimburse the injured |
employee for fees and costs already paid. That reimbursement of fees and costs is to be a '
credit against any money the injured employee owes to the employer or carrier. If it is not |
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a credit, the carrier does not pay any portion of the fees and costs. The injured employee
carries the complete burden of the fees and costs. Th<* compensation carrier in reality
receives a benefit for no cost or risk. Applying the statute as Judge Sims did, provides an
injured employee some incentive to bring a lawsuit agcins^a liable third party, which justly
requires the liable party to bear the responsibility for the injury or death.
In any event, nothing is paid "twice" as alleged by CNA. The Applicants pay
the fees and costs "once" when they pay them to the attorneys. Applicants thereafter get
their statutory "credit" for these fees based upon the proportionate share of fees and costs
payable by CNA. In this particular case, the proportionate share of fees and costs of CNA
happens to be 100%. Because the credit for attorneys' fees and costs far exceeded the
Applicants' recovery that was payable to CNA, the Administrative Law Judge appropriately
determined that CNA was not entitled to any reimbursement or offset.
In some cases such as this, the worker's compensation carrier may not receive
any benefit from the third party lawsuit, but one can hardly consider the benefits received
by the Applicants, including the worker's compensation benefits, adequate to compensate
them for the loss of their husband, son and father. However, this is an unusual situation.
In this case, the attorneys' fee was 40% because of the difficult nature of the case and
because it went to trial.

Also, the cost of taking a products liability case to trial is

enormous. Besides those factors, CNA had a large obligation because it involved a death
on a worker with young minor children. Perhaps the most compelling reason for the results
is the fact that the judgment was relatively small mostly because so much fault was
attributed to the employer.
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However, the formula does work and it is fair. Consider how it would have
>

> >

> >

>

work under the circumstance of the settlement in tbfe previous lawsajt pgainst the Freeport
Center. In that lawsuit, $375,000 was paid in settlement by the Freeport Center. The
attorneys' fees and costs were $131,736.6 leaving $243,263.84 available to distribute. CNA's
interest was approximately $265,980 ($341 per week for 15 years). Here again CNA's
interest exceeded the available money. Therefore, CNA's proportional share of costs and
fees would have been 100% or $131,736.16. Since all of the available money would have
been CNA's minus it's proportionate share of costs and fees, CNA would have received a
benefit of approximately $111,527.68 from the settlement ($243,263.84 - $131,736.16).
Let's compare that to the actually benefit CNA received from that settlement.
CNA received $8,263.84 in reimbursement and an offset of $136 per week for approximately
fourteen (14) years or an additional $99,008 benefit for a total benefit of $107,271.84. In
that case, CNA actually agreed to accept less of a benefit than the formula used by Judge
Sims would have given it. The difference was the settlement was greater than the judgment,
but the fees and costs were less even though CNA would have been responsible for 100%
of the fees and costs in both cases.
POINT III
THE APPROPRIATE METHOD OF REDUCING WORKERS
COMPENSATION CARRIER'S SHARE OF PROCEEDS
BECAUSE OF FAULT ATTRIBUTABLE TO EMPLOYER.
The Administrative Law Judge's Order made a cursory analysis of the
provisions of § 36-l-62(5)(b)(ii), which requires a reduction equal to the percentage fault
attributed to the employer and his employee in any amounts paid to reimburse the insurer.
See, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order at p.6. Our reading of this
-13-
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subsection, in light of the dictates of Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223,
>
*
> > >

>
> •> > >
> >
> > »
> > > > >

(Utah 1967), compels us to conclude that the "fault" jadjustmeht is to' be! made after reducing |
the insurer's right to reimbursement by its proportionate share of the third party litigation
fees and costs. Thus, the Defendants' right to reimbursement and offset must be reduced
by its share of fees and costs and further reduced by the 75% liability attributed to the
employer, Redd Roofing, and its employee, Mr. Esquivel, under the statute. However, since |
the credit available to the Applicants for CNA'S proportionate share of costs and fees '
exceeds the money available for reimbursement and offset, further reduction is unnecessary. I

CONCLUSION
The Administrative Law Judge correctly applied Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5) i
in apportioning the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining the judgment against the
third party. Therefore, the Applicants respectfully request that defendants' Motion for
Review of Order be denied and that Judge Sims' Order be affirmed in its entirety.
Dated this 2nd day of April, 1997.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
*
>

>
> >

> >) >
> > >

I hereby certify that a true and cortett copy qf AppKqaijts' RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR REVIEW OF ORDER was sewed upon the counsel of
record at the address listed below, by depositing same into first class United States mail,
postage prepaid, on this 2nd day of April, 1997.
Theodore E. Kanell
Attorney for Defendants
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
4 Triad Center, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

Legal Secretary
Q-\WP51\CLIENT\1513\F\RESPV WPD
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Exhibit 5

35-1-62

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72; C.L. 1917,
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933,
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58;

L. 1946, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 76, § 3; 1973,
ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3.
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Exhibit 6

Mathematical Analysis of Petitioners' Proposed Formula
gross judgment
r n n t " l ri' Ji-Mil

| i i > i„nI

costs
carrier lien

=

L

attorney fees

=

contingent rate x gross judgment

ii= t

j i ldgn lei i t

g r o s s judgmei.
minus c o s t s

t o t a l expenses

p i ".i::' • •'' nt"

[1] Under the petitioners' proposed formula, the carrier's
"proportionate" share of the expenses is the carrier 1ien (L)
divided by the net judgment. In other words:
c a r r i e r p r o p o r t: i o i i
j (1 - r)

1:

[2] The expenses charged to the carrier equal the carrier's
proportionate share times the total expenses:
carrier charged expenses

x

(j (r) i k)

j (r) i k
carrier charged expenses

1,
„ ::; ::
j [• I

t )

1:

As established in step [3] on the previous page,
j (r) + k
carrier charged expenses

=

L

x
j (1 - r) - k

[4]

The costs (k) will always be a positive number.

and

j (r) + k

>

j (r)

j (1 - r) - k

<

j(l-r)

Therefore,

[5] In a fraction, if the numerator decreases but the denominator stays the same, the quotient will decrease (as long as the
numerator and denominator are both positive). Similarly, if the
numerator remains constant and the denominator increases,
the
quotient also decreases. And if both occur -- the numerator
decreases and the denominator increases -- the quotient will
decrease even more.

[6]

Therefore,
j (r) + k

j (r)

j (1 - r) - k

j (1 - r)

[I.e., because the fraction on the left has both a
higher numerator and a lower denominator than the
fraction on the right, it will necessarily have a
higher value than the fraction on the right]

[7]

So, because L is always positive
j (r) + k

L

j (r)

x

>

L

j (1 - r) - k

x
j (1 - r)

[8] But as established back in step [3] and as shown at the top
of this page, the left side of equation [7] is the same as the
carrier's
charged expenses.
So
j(r)
carrier charged expenses

>

L

x
j (1 - r)

carrier charged expenses

>

I« x

--j(l

•

r)

T 1 :i :i s ::: a i i 1: e i: e d i i c e d c • i i e s t: e p f i i r 11 i e i: i
c a r r i e r c h a r g e d expei i s e s
1 - r
Liuj in other words, the expenses charged to the car rier under
the petitioners1 proposed formula will always be greater than
L

x
1

[11] Applying this formula, if the contingent fee rate is 40
percent (0.4), then the carrier's share of the expenses will
always be greater than,
0.4
1
P'

l -

^'ri-r

0. 4

be charged at iedbL
0 .4

[13] Or, the carrier's expenses will be at least
L

x

2
--3

In other words, with a forty percent contingent fee, the
carrier will always be charged at least two-thirds of its lien as
its "proportionate" share of expenses! (Also, note that the
higher the costs, the more the carrier's share will exceed twothirds of its lien. Thus, in our case, the carrier's share

supposedly exceeds the entire amount of its lien.)
[14] Similarly, with a contingent fee of one-third (.33), the
carrier will always be charged at least
0.333
L

x
1 - .333

[15] So the carrier's expenses will be greater than
0.333
L

x
0.666

[16] Or, the carrier will always be charged at least
1
L

x
2

So even with a one-third contingent fee, the carrier will
always be charged at least half of its lien as its "proportionate" share of the expenses. (This is the situation posed by the
hypothetical in Breen v. Caesar's Palace, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nev.
1986) .

